The China Question, Once Again

IT is not an exaggeration to say .that “China” as an international issue has held a, if not the, front and center position in U.S. Asian policy throughout the twentieth century. Beginning with the Open Door Notes, 1899-1900, we have made manifest the American interest in the preservation of an independent China. The latter, especially after its successful nationalist revolution of 1911 that established the Republic of China (RC), became successively an ally in the two World Wars, a founding member of the United Nations, and one of the five permanent members with veto powers in the United Nations’ Security Council.

This is not the place to rehash the pros and cons of U.S. policy during the post World War II war between the Nationalist or Kuomintang government of the Republic of China and its Communist opposition. The latter led by Mao Tse-tung won out on the mainland; the Nationalist government removed itself to Taiwan, historically a province of China, and the surrounding small islands. The U.S. washed its hands of the Mao-Chiang conflict in the notorious “White Paper” of 1949. President Truman permitted the American diplomatic establishment to remain in the mainland after the Communist victory in October 1949. The point of that action probably was to show that the U.S. was prepared to recognize the Communist regime of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after a reasonable dust-settling period. However, the PRC carried on a campaign of harassment against the China-based American diplomatic group; and by the spring of 1950 we withdrew our ambassador and all subordinate officials. The Korean war in June 1950 sealed the issue of recognition.

FT

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Frank N. Trager

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IT is not an exaggeration to say .that “China” as an international issue has held a, if not the, front and center position in U.S. Asian policy throughout the twentieth century. Beginning with the Open Door Notes, 1899-1900, we have made manifest the American interest in the preservation of an independent China. The latter, especially after its successful nationalist revolution of 1911 that established the Republic of China (RC), became successively an ally in the two World Wars, a founding member of the United Nations, and one of the five permanent members with veto powers in the United Nations’ Security Council.

This is not the place to rehash the pros and cons of U.S. policy during the post World War II war between the Nationalist or Kuomintang government of the Republic of China and its Communist opposition. The latter led by Mao Tse-tung won out on the mainland; the Nationalist government removed itself to Taiwan, historically a province of China, and the surrounding small islands. The U.S. washed its hands of the Mao-Chiang conflict in the notorious “White Paper” of 1949. President Truman permitted the American diplomatic establishment to remain in the mainland after the Communist victory in October 1949. The point of that action probably was to show that the U.S. was prepared to recognize the Communist regime of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after a reasonable dust-settling period. However, the PRC carried on a campaign of harassment against the China-based American diplomatic group; and by the spring of 1950 we withdrew our ambassador and all subordinate officials. The Korean war in June 1950 sealed the issue of recognition.