Dancing with Bears

REALPOLITIK is back. But it is still not “in.” Since the elections of December 1993 sent Russia’s “shock therapists” packing, it has become safe, indeed obligatory, to worry about Russia’s internal course. Discord over Yugoslavia and, more recently, NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” have now extended these worries to foreign policy. But who is worrying about Western policy? Governments insist that it continues to be “reviewed,” but resist any suggestion that it be reconsidered.

Regrettable this might be; surprising it is not. In today’s world, a reassessment of policy toward Russia would be a trying and ticklish exercise. Where governments have not viewed the “collapse of Communism” as an opportunity to turn to domestic issues, their electorates have. Agendas are fixed, and plates are full. Moreover, in countries where sound-bites fall as thick and fast as hailstones, who would be able to distinguish between the “end of partnership” and the “return of Cold War”? Who in fact would be able to guarantee that a firm response to Russia’s new assertiveness would not finish off Russia’s “democrats” and put Russia’s neo-Cold Warriors in control? The sum total of politics, uncertainty, and anxiety is, therefore, inertia.

JS

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James Sherr

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REALPOLITIK is back. But it is still not “in.” Since the elections of December 1993 sent Russia’s “shock therapists” packing, it has become safe, indeed obligatory, to worry about Russia’s internal course. Discord over Yugoslavia and, more recently, NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” have now extended these worries to foreign policy. But who is worrying about Western policy? Governments insist that it continues to be “reviewed,” but resist any suggestion that it be reconsidered.

Regrettable this might be; surprising it is not. In today’s world, a reassessment of policy toward Russia would be a trying and ticklish exercise. Where governments have not viewed the “collapse of Communism” as an opportunity to turn to domestic issues, their electorates have. Agendas are fixed, and plates are full. Moreover, in countries where sound-bites fall as thick and fast as hailstones, who would be able to distinguish between the “end of partnership” and the “return of Cold War”? Who in fact would be able to guarantee that a firm response to Russia’s new assertiveness would not finish off Russia’s “democrats” and put Russia’s neo-Cold Warriors in control? The sum total of politics, uncertainty, and anxiety is, therefore, inertia.