Middle East Breakthrough?

In early April, twenty U.S. ambassadors to Middle Eastern countries convened quietly in Washington to review peace prospects for their sector of the world. For 15 months—ever since the Marines were pulled out of Beirut—the Reagan Administration had been benignly neglectful of that region. But those months of inactivity had produced a convergence of forces that led the ambassadors to conclude the U.S. ought to break out of its insularity and re-assume a quasi-brokering role. They were so persuasive that Secretary of State Shultz and National Security Advisor McFarlane both agreed, and measured initiatives were launched. Here is what the ambassadors told the Administration’s two most powerful foreign-policy strategists:

First, Israel is ready. The government is moderate and prepared to deal with Jordan concerning the West Bank. Peres wants negotiations, and he enjoys enough domestic support to pursue them. The latest evidence of this is Labor’s winning 66 per cent of the vote (up 3 per cent from 1981) in the Histadrut Labor Federation’s May 13 election, over Likud with 22 per cent (down 5 per cent from 1981). “Oh, his hand is not completely free, as we saw when Ezer Weizman’s repair trip to Cairo was nearly scuttled by the coalition cabinet,” notes a senior State Department aide. “Yet the get-off-the-dime process started by Labor is likely to gain de facto acceptance even by Likud.” The reasoning here is that Likud won’t bolt the Knesset on this issue because Peres would call for new elections, Labor would win a clear majority, and the coalition on which Likud depends would become superfluous.

JM

About the Author

John McLaughlin

Featured Tags

In early April, twenty U.S. ambassadors to Middle Eastern countries convened quietly in Washington to review peace prospects for their sector of the world. For 15 months—ever since the Marines were pulled out of Beirut—the Reagan Administration had been benignly neglectful of that region. But those months of inactivity had produced a convergence of forces that led the ambassadors to conclude the U.S. ought to break out of its insularity and re-assume a quasi-brokering role. They were so persuasive that Secretary of State Shultz and National Security Advisor McFarlane both agreed, and measured initiatives were launched. Here is what the ambassadors told the Administration’s two most powerful foreign-policy strategists:

First, Israel is ready. The government is moderate and prepared to deal with Jordan concerning the West Bank. Peres wants negotiations, and he enjoys enough domestic support to pursue them. The latest evidence of this is Labor’s winning 66 per cent of the vote (up 3 per cent from 1981) in the Histadrut Labor Federation’s May 13 election, over Likud with 22 per cent (down 5 per cent from 1981). “Oh, his hand is not completely free, as we saw when Ezer Weizman’s repair trip to Cairo was nearly scuttled by the coalition cabinet,” notes a senior State Department aide. “Yet the get-off-the-dime process started by Labor is likely to gain de facto acceptance even by Likud.” The reasoning here is that Likud won’t bolt the Knesset on this issue because Peres would call for new elections, Labor would win a clear majority, and the coalition on which Likud depends would become superfluous.