Compromised

IN October 1998, an investigator with the House committee formed to look into Chinese espionage and acquisition of advanced U.S. technology questioned an official of Hughes Space and Communications, a California company. Had the corporation given China information to “improve” its rockets after one had blown up with a Hughes satellite on top of it? “Well,” answered the official, “I’m not sure—‘improve’ is a difficult word.” Only after several similar dodges would he admit that Hughes had indeed suggested improvements to China: “If they were actually improvements.”

The report recently issued by the committee, headed by California Republican Chris Cox, makes clear that, after losing two satellites in Chinese launches, Hughes knew it had to make Chinese rockets more reliable and knew that such help was illegal without a State Department license. Its decision was easy. It handed China the technology, without a license.

About the Author

Rich Lowry

Rich Lowry is the editor in chief of National Review.

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IN October 1998, an investigator with the House committee formed to look into Chinese espionage and acquisition of advanced U.S. technology questioned an official of Hughes Space and Communications, a California company. Had the corporation given China information to “improve” its rockets after one had blown up with a Hughes satellite on top of it? “Well,” answered the official, “I’m not sure—‘improve’ is a difficult word.” Only after several similar dodges would he admit that Hughes had indeed suggested improvements to China: “If they were actually improvements.”

The report recently issued by the committee, headed by California Republican Chris Cox, makes clear that, after losing two satellites in Chinese launches, Hughes knew it had to make Chinese rockets more reliable and knew that such help was illegal without a State Department license. Its decision was easy. It handed China the technology, without a license.