Two Decades Late

MORE than five years after the War on Terror began, the strains it has placed on the U.S. military are beginning to show. Some observers have noticed increasing signs of tension between the Pentagon and our commanders in the field. Inter-service rivalries have started to kick up again as the Marines talk about getting back to their boats, the Navy talks about recapitalizing parts of its fleet, and the Air Force takes up the case of the F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and so on, with reference to more-or-less distant threats.

At one level, these problems seem to have a common cause: the persistent notion that the current large-scale deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan will be short-lived, and we need to be ready for what comes next. In reality, that notion is not the cause of these strains, but a symptom of problems that go back much farther. Military policymakers view the current level of deployment as an aberration. They do this because they have to-because the military system they’re part of is not designed to support such a level in the long term. Recognizing this fact means recognizing the unpalatable truth that the old ways won’t work in the 21st century. The world has changed, and the threats we face have changed, and that means it is time for a fundamental reorganization of our national-security apparatus.

FW

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Frederick W. Kagan

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MORE than five years after the War on Terror began, the strains it has placed on the U.S. military are beginning to show. Some observers have noticed increasing signs of tension between the Pentagon and our commanders in the field. Inter-service rivalries have started to kick up again as the Marines talk about getting back to their boats, the Navy talks about recapitalizing parts of its fleet, and the Air Force takes up the case of the F-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and so on, with reference to more-or-less distant threats.

At one level, these problems seem to have a common cause: the persistent notion that the current large-scale deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan will be short-lived, and we need to be ready for what comes next. In reality, that notion is not the cause of these strains, but a symptom of problems that go back much farther. Military policymakers view the current level of deployment as an aberration. They do this because they have to-because the military system they’re part of is not designed to support such a level in the long term. Recognizing this fact means recognizing the unpalatable truth that the old ways won’t work in the 21st century. The world has changed, and the threats we face have changed, and that means it is time for a fundamental reorganization of our national-security apparatus.