The Third World War

Two weeks ago in this space I explained that both the Soviet Union and the United States might be able to achieve a nuclear first-strike capability during the 1970s, and that this would create a strategic situation of extreme instability. A “first-strike capability” means, let me repeat, a strategic weapons force able, if launched first, to knock out enough of the opponent’s force to prevent him from inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation. (The adjective “unacceptable” was dropped two weeks ago.)

Could the Soviet Union and the United States come to an agreement that would foreclose this possibility? I concluded that there was one way and only one way in which a genuine agreement could be reached: by the reciprocal introduction of each side’s strategic experts into the other side’s strategic system. Each side would have to feel certain the other side was not cheating. If it did not feel certain, it would inevitably take counter-measures, no matter what the formal terms of agreement. But nothing could give sufficient assurance except one’s own men— enough of them—on the spot; and the spot in this case is the inner workings of the other side’s strategic system.

JB

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James Burnham

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Two weeks ago in this space I explained that both the Soviet Union and the United States might be able to achieve a nuclear first-strike capability during the 1970s, and that this would create a strategic situation of extreme instability. A “first-strike capability” means, let me repeat, a strategic weapons force able, if launched first, to knock out enough of the opponent’s force to prevent him from inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation. (The adjective “unacceptable” was dropped two weeks ago.)

Could the Soviet Union and the United States come to an agreement that would foreclose this possibility? I concluded that there was one way and only one way in which a genuine agreement could be reached: by the reciprocal introduction of each side’s strategic experts into the other side’s strategic system. Each side would have to feel certain the other side was not cheating. If it did not feel certain, it would inevitably take counter-measures, no matter what the formal terms of agreement. But nothing could give sufficient assurance except one’s own men— enough of them—on the spot; and the spot in this case is the inner workings of the other side’s strategic system.