Look Behind You, Khrushchev

We often hear that, in triggering the Berlin crisis, Nikita Khrushchev moved from a position of strength growing out of the Soviet Union’s economic successes and its accomplishments with nuclear weapons and guided missiles. Yet I suspect that exactly the contrary is true—that the Soviet leadership moves, not from strength, but from serious internal weaknesses; indeed, that the prime purpose of the Berlin demarche was to help solve the problems at home. A resounding victory in the Berlin situation is, of course, what Khrushchev is after; but a tie, or even a defeat, will have supplied a necessary diversion from domestic troubles that may seriously endanger his rule.

There is nothing new about this strategy. Many a dictator, confronted with internal difficulties, has sought to dodge or divert attention from them by engaging in some foreign adventure. Khrushchev’s concrete needs, moreover, conform to the usual pattern: in addition to a dissatisfied populace, the Soviet leader has got to cope with potential rivals for supreme power, with a potential palace revolt. Khrushchev himself has made it clear that he has rivals, and who they are. The so-called anti-party group—Comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Shepilov, and more recently, Bulganin—has been the target of several dozen Khrushchev tirades over the past year and a half.

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Nicolas De Rochefort

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We often hear that, in triggering the Berlin crisis, Nikita Khrushchev moved from a position of strength growing out of the Soviet Union’s economic successes and its accomplishments with nuclear weapons and guided missiles. Yet I suspect that exactly the contrary is true—that the Soviet leadership moves, not from strength, but from serious internal weaknesses; indeed, that the prime purpose of the Berlin demarche was to help solve the problems at home. A resounding victory in the Berlin situation is, of course, what Khrushchev is after; but a tie, or even a defeat, will have supplied a necessary diversion from domestic troubles that may seriously endanger his rule.

There is nothing new about this strategy. Many a dictator, confronted with internal difficulties, has sought to dodge or divert attention from them by engaging in some foreign adventure. Khrushchev’s concrete needs, moreover, conform to the usual pattern: in addition to a dissatisfied populace, the Soviet leader has got to cope with potential rivals for supreme power, with a potential palace revolt. Khrushchev himself has made it clear that he has rivals, and who they are. The so-called anti-party group—Comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Shepilov, and more recently, Bulganin—has been the target of several dozen Khrushchev tirades over the past year and a half.