Norman B. Hannah
All the world wants peace and disarmament, but SALT is neither. The trouble with SALT is that it does not reflect a true meeting of the minds between the United States and the Soviet Union. This doesnโt necessarily discredit the whole SALT process, for it isnโt extraordinary that the parties to a contract see it differently and have different objectives. It does mean that we ignore the differences only at our peril. It also means that we should ensure that Soviet and American objectives, though different, are not incompatible. We should sign and ratify a treaty only after taking these differences openly into account. So far, there has been a tendency to assume a symmetrical balance of U.S. and Soviet attitudes toward SALT. In fact, however, the SALT process is the very epitome of asymmetryโin negotiating style, and in political and military objectives. As we approach the debate on ratification, it is important to lay this asymmetry open to view. Thatโ and not the reaching of ultimate conclusions on the particular terms of the SALT II draftโis the purpose of this article.




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