The Rhodesia Decision

The Rhodesian problem is central to any policy decision on whether or not to stand up to the Soviets. Conversely, in considering Rhodesia, all else is secondary to the Soviet aspect: Mr. Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and his “rebellion” against the British Crown: the UN and its sanctions; the Commonwealth; the Anglo-American plan; President Carter’s susceptibilities; and, above all, Ambassador Andrew Young.

The Anglo-American plan, on which Britain’s former Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, sought and failed to make his reputation, did not survive Secretary of State Vance’s visit to London on May 21-22. Nor can it be expected to loom large when the Commonwealth summiteers meet in Lusaka in August. It was motivated, as previous efforts were, by the search for “peace”—meaning a settlement acceptable to the “people” of Rhodesia and also to the so-called Patriotic Front which is trying, with massive Soviet backing, to impose its will upon that people.

BC

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Brian Crozier

The Rhodesian problem is central to any policy decision on whether or not to stand up to the Soviets. Conversely, in considering Rhodesia, all else is secondary to the Soviet aspect: Mr. Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and his “rebellion” against the British Crown: the UN and its sanctions; the Commonwealth; the Anglo-American plan; President Carter’s susceptibilities; and, above all, Ambassador Andrew Young.

The Anglo-American plan, on which Britain’s former Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, sought and failed to make his reputation, did not survive Secretary of State Vance’s visit to London on May 21-22. Nor can it be expected to loom large when the Commonwealth summiteers meet in Lusaka in August. It was motivated, as previous efforts were, by the search for “peace”—meaning a settlement acceptable to the “people” of Rhodesia and also to the so-called Patriotic Front which is trying, with massive Soviet backing, to impose its will upon that people.