National Intelligence and the USSR

WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE & SEYMOUR WEISS

Toward the end of 1976, press reports revealed the existence of a presidentially approved group of outsiders selected to review U.S. intelligence on Soviet strategic programs and objectives. Working independently of the official intelligence community— the “A Team”—but with access to the same information, the group of experts —the “B Team”—was charged with the evaluation of Soviet strategic programs and of the motivations, concepts, and objectives behind those programs. The B Team analysis was in part motivated by a growing concern over the inexplicable underestimation in past National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) of Soviet strategic programs. The independent analysis, however, was not only to determine whether raw intelligence data would support conclusions on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives different from past official estimates, it was also an experimental effort to improve the quality of the U.S. strategic intelligence analysis and estimating process. Shortly after word of the B Team appeared in the press, highly speculative and dramatic charges were also made there concerning the presumed conclusions of the B Team study— which remains highly classified—its influence on the official NIE, and even the personal motivations of the individuals who composed the team. It was suggested, for example, that the study was designed to embarrass the incoming Carter Administration, despite the fact that the study was commissioned by an Administration that at the time hoped and expected to remain in office —an Administration that would bear the brunt of any implicit criticism of recent intelligence evaluations and processes.

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WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE & SEYMOUR WEISS

Toward the end of 1976, press reports revealed the existence of a presidentially approved group of outsiders selected to review U.S. intelligence on Soviet strategic programs and objectives. Working independently of the official intelligence community— the “A Team”—but with access to the same information, the group of experts —the “B Team”—was charged with the evaluation of Soviet strategic programs and of the motivations, concepts, and objectives behind those programs. The B Team analysis was in part motivated by a growing concern over the inexplicable underestimation in past National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) of Soviet strategic programs. The independent analysis, however, was not only to determine whether raw intelligence data would support conclusions on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives different from past official estimates, it was also an experimental effort to improve the quality of the U.S. strategic intelligence analysis and estimating process. Shortly after word of the B Team appeared in the press, highly speculative and dramatic charges were also made there concerning the presumed conclusions of the B Team study— which remains highly classified—its influence on the official NIE, and even the personal motivations of the individuals who composed the team. It was suggested, for example, that the study was designed to embarrass the incoming Carter Administration, despite the fact that the study was commissioned by an Administration that at the time hoped and expected to remain in office —an Administration that would bear the brunt of any implicit criticism of recent intelligence evaluations and processes.