That Old Summit Magic

There’s an irresistible charm about Summitry. By the time this issue goes to press, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will have performed the sacred rites of that old Summit magic: hands will be shaken, glasses clinked; the sun will shine a little brighter, hearts rest a little easier, because in faraway Moscow two men who hold the fate of the world in their all-too-human hands will have signed a communiqué or perhaps some new agreements. The substance of such agreements seems hardly to matter. In this style of diplomacy, it is the “new spirit of peace,” not the details, that counts.

Those who are not connoisseurs of the arms-control process may be surprised to learn that the current flirtation with Moscow is the fifth in a long line of sequels. Nowadays, the term détente is usually reserved for the prolonged period of “eased tension” inaugurated by Richard Nixon and continued during the Ford and Carter Administrations. But a careful look at the history of Soviet-American relations since World War II shows that détente is not an isolated phenomenon, but a recurring temptation: in at least three other periods, Washington attempted friendly relations with the Kremlin. Each period was marked by Summit meetings, arms-control accords, and high expectations of a new era of cooperation. (See chart, pp. 38-39.) Each was ended by an act of Soviet aggression. And, when the dust settled, each period of détente left the West in a relatively worse position. By contrast, the interludes between détentes—periods of more normal relations with the Soviets—seem to produce consistently better foreign-policy results.

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Constantine C. Menges

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There’s an irresistible charm about Summitry. By the time this issue goes to press, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will have performed the sacred rites of that old Summit magic: hands will be shaken, glasses clinked; the sun will shine a little brighter, hearts rest a little easier, because in faraway Moscow two men who hold the fate of the world in their all-too-human hands will have signed a communiqué or perhaps some new agreements. The substance of such agreements seems hardly to matter. In this style of diplomacy, it is the “new spirit of peace,” not the details, that counts.

Those who are not connoisseurs of the arms-control process may be surprised to learn that the current flirtation with Moscow is the fifth in a long line of sequels. Nowadays, the term détente is usually reserved for the prolonged period of “eased tension” inaugurated by Richard Nixon and continued during the Ford and Carter Administrations. But a careful look at the history of Soviet-American relations since World War II shows that détente is not an isolated phenomenon, but a recurring temptation: in at least three other periods, Washington attempted friendly relations with the Kremlin. Each period was marked by Summit meetings, arms-control accords, and high expectations of a new era of cooperation. (See chart, pp. 38-39.) Each was ended by an act of Soviet aggression. And, when the dust settled, each period of détente left the West in a relatively worse position. By contrast, the interludes between détentes—periods of more normal relations with the Soviets—seem to produce consistently better foreign-policy results.