Central America’s Big Brother

The United States and Mexico seem to have similar hopes for Central America. Both nations want economic growth and political stability for the region. Those conditions would make for friendly neighbors, provide good trade opportunities for both of the larger nations, and contribute to the Western Hemisphere’s security against non-democratic political pressures. The differences are over how to realize these hopes. Mexico’s President Miguel de la Madrid and Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda claim that Central America’s instability stems from lack of economic opportunity for the working class and lack of social justice, their term for welfare programs. But if those were the only causes, Mexico itself, confronted by high unemployment, inflation, and the discontent evidenced by the migration of millions of Mexicans to the United States, would be rent by guerrilla warfare.

Both Mexican leaders deny that the on-going hostilities in Central America spring from the conflict between the Soviet Union’s expansionist foreign policy and the United States’ concern over hemispheric security. Both the Mexican media and the Mexican government seem aware of a U.S. presence in Central America but unaware of a Nicaraguan presence in Salvadoran guerrilla camps, of Cubans in the Nicaraguan armed forces, or of Soviets in both the military and civilian sectors of Cuba’s government. The failure of Mexican officialdom to acknowledge the easily discernible role of Moscow and Havana inside Central America makes it impossible for Mexico City and the United States to formulate a binational approach to Central America’s problems.

MA

About the Author

Marvin Alisky

Featured Tags

The United States and Mexico seem to have similar hopes for Central America. Both nations want economic growth and political stability for the region. Those conditions would make for friendly neighbors, provide good trade opportunities for both of the larger nations, and contribute to the Western Hemisphere’s security against non-democratic political pressures. The differences are over how to realize these hopes. Mexico’s President Miguel de la Madrid and Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda claim that Central America’s instability stems from lack of economic opportunity for the working class and lack of social justice, their term for welfare programs. But if those were the only causes, Mexico itself, confronted by high unemployment, inflation, and the discontent evidenced by the migration of millions of Mexicans to the United States, would be rent by guerrilla warfare.

Both Mexican leaders deny that the on-going hostilities in Central America spring from the conflict between the Soviet Union’s expansionist foreign policy and the United States’ concern over hemispheric security. Both the Mexican media and the Mexican government seem aware of a U.S. presence in Central America but unaware of a Nicaraguan presence in Salvadoran guerrilla camps, of Cubans in the Nicaraguan armed forces, or of Soviets in both the military and civilian sectors of Cuba’s government. The failure of Mexican officialdom to acknowledge the easily discernible role of Moscow and Havana inside Central America makes it impossible for Mexico City and the United States to formulate a binational approach to Central America’s problems.