The Middle Eastern Vietnam?

The agony of our experience in Vietnam and the perilously explosive situation which exists in the Middle East have their roots in our inability to recognize the essence and source of the present danger. The fallacy of our foreign policy lies in our persistent evasion of the fact that our adversary is none other than the Soviet Union. Understandably disturbed by the frightening prospect of direct encounter with that formidable enemy, we are buying psychological solace through a kind of “whipping boy”—and Red China is our favored target for venting our frustrations. This in turn leads us to the second widespread fallacy, that Vietnam and the Middle East are two separate conflicts, managed independently from Peking and Moscow respectively.

That belief creates in consequence a chain reaction of other fallacies, the most prominent of which is the constantly-hinted possibility of a quid pro quo horse-trade, involving Vietnam and the Middle East—a game which presumably could go either way, depending on the relative strength of the supporters of opposing points of view in American public opinion. The irony of such delusion lies in the supposition that we would be dealing with the Soviets at the expense of China, while actually the Soviets would single-handedly manipulate the trade, raising the stakes at will in their reach for the ultimate price, which would eventually include both Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

RB

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Roman Brackman

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The agony of our experience in Vietnam and the perilously explosive situation which exists in the Middle East have their roots in our inability to recognize the essence and source of the present danger. The fallacy of our foreign policy lies in our persistent evasion of the fact that our adversary is none other than the Soviet Union. Understandably disturbed by the frightening prospect of direct encounter with that formidable enemy, we are buying psychological solace through a kind of “whipping boy”—and Red China is our favored target for venting our frustrations. This in turn leads us to the second widespread fallacy, that Vietnam and the Middle East are two separate conflicts, managed independently from Peking and Moscow respectively.

That belief creates in consequence a chain reaction of other fallacies, the most prominent of which is the constantly-hinted possibility of a quid pro quo horse-trade, involving Vietnam and the Middle East—a game which presumably could go either way, depending on the relative strength of the supporters of opposing points of view in American public opinion. The irony of such delusion lies in the supposition that we would be dealing with the Soviets at the expense of China, while actually the Soviets would single-handedly manipulate the trade, raising the stakes at will in their reach for the ultimate price, which would eventually include both Southeast Asia and the Middle East.