Moscow in the Pacific

Ghostly images linger from a thousand World War II movies: American leathernecks storming sun-washed beaches of the South Pacific, steel-grey naval vessels surging through the blue waters toward ultimate victory over our enemies. Nowadays, when people talk about American security interests abroad, they’re usually thinking of Europe. But since World War II, America’s maritime strength in the Pacific has given us and our allies a significant strategic edge over the Soviet Union, permitting the Allies to concentrate on Europe, and forcing the Soviets’ attentions away from that theater. That edge can no longer be taken for granted; the Soviets are moving with determination to penetrate America’s Pacific shield.

In only 15 years (1970-85) U.S. trade in East Asia and the Pacific increased tenfold. By 1980 the Pacific rim had eclipsed Europe as America’s primary trading partner. Today the Pacific accounts for at least 35 per cent of all U.S. trade. This commerce includes not only consumer goods but also strategic products essential to NATO—some $1.2 billion worth of semiconductors; another $120 million worth of microchips; vital components of our F-16 fighter aircraft; and other military hardware. Trade with the Pacific rim confers enormous economic benefits, but in military terms, it also creates a new point of vulnerability. Moscow has obviously taken note.

About the Author

Seth Cropsey

Seth Cropsey is president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy. The U.S. Naval Institute Press published his most recent book, co-authored with Harry Halem, Breaking the New Axis: A U.S. Grand Strategy for Eurasia, in April.

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Ghostly images linger from a thousand World War II movies: American leathernecks storming sun-washed beaches of the South Pacific, steel-grey naval vessels surging through the blue waters toward ultimate victory over our enemies. Nowadays, when people talk about American security interests abroad, they’re usually thinking of Europe. But since World War II, America’s maritime strength in the Pacific has given us and our allies a significant strategic edge over the Soviet Union, permitting the Allies to concentrate on Europe, and forcing the Soviets’ attentions away from that theater. That edge can no longer be taken for granted; the Soviets are moving with determination to penetrate America’s Pacific shield.

In only 15 years (1970-85) U.S. trade in East Asia and the Pacific increased tenfold. By 1980 the Pacific rim had eclipsed Europe as America’s primary trading partner. Today the Pacific accounts for at least 35 per cent of all U.S. trade. This commerce includes not only consumer goods but also strategic products essential to NATO—some $1.2 billion worth of semiconductors; another $120 million worth of microchips; vital components of our F-16 fighter aircraft; and other military hardware. Trade with the Pacific rim confers enormous economic benefits, but in military terms, it also creates a new point of vulnerability. Moscow has obviously taken note.

About the Author

Seth Cropsey

Seth Cropsey is president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy. The U.S. Naval Institute Press published his most recent book, co-authored with Harry Halem, Breaking the New Axis: A U.S. Grand Strategy for Eurasia, in April.