The Third Balkan War

JUDGING from the hesitant American response to the Yugoslav crisis, Washington’s foreign policy continues to be plagued by the Vietnam syndrome, thought to have been cured once and for all by the Gulf War victory.

In his June 1991 trip to Belgrade, then—Secretary of State James Baker sided with the Serb-dominated Yugoslav regime by warning the non-Serb republics not to expect U.S. recognition of their secessions. This tragic blunder gave the proponents of Great Serbian chauvinism carte blanche to unleash a war of aggression which has so far cost the lives of more than fifty thousand civilians in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Rossen Vassilev

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JUDGING from the hesitant American response to the Yugoslav crisis, Washington’s foreign policy continues to be plagued by the Vietnam syndrome, thought to have been cured once and for all by the Gulf War victory.

In his June 1991 trip to Belgrade, then—Secretary of State James Baker sided with the Serb-dominated Yugoslav regime by warning the non-Serb republics not to expect U.S. recognition of their secessions. This tragic blunder gave the proponents of Great Serbian chauvinism carte blanche to unleash a war of aggression which has so far cost the lives of more than fifty thousand civilians in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.