The Time of the Fox

The policy, or lack of policy, of the Carter Administration toward recent events in the region of the African Horn is provoking harsh criticism not only from conservatives but from many liberals sensitive to the global Soviet threat. The critics judge the policy to be weak, procrastinating, ambiguous, and heedless of an increasingly probable strategic disaster for this country and NATO. In place of its seeming passivity, many of the critics believe that we should be openly siding with Somalia against the Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban combine, and should be sending Somalia weapons of an amount and power sufficient to deal with the weapons sent to the Ethiopian side by Moscow.

We must assume that the President, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs, and the Director of the CIA are fully aware of the strategic significance of the Horn—its geographical and geopolitical relations to the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal traffic, the Arabian peninsula, the Indian Ocean, north-south air routes, etc. On this they surely do not need lessons from amateurs. We have, moreover, no reason to doubt their devotion to the nation’s security. There must be reasons that they find cogent for being cautious, and for avoiding an all-out, public commitment to Somalia. Without attempting to judge the merits of the dispute, I will list what I think some of those reasons may be:

JB

About the Author

James Burnham

The policy, or lack of policy, of the Carter Administration toward recent events in the region of the African Horn is provoking harsh criticism not only from conservatives but from many liberals sensitive to the global Soviet threat. The critics judge the policy to be weak, procrastinating, ambiguous, and heedless of an increasingly probable strategic disaster for this country and NATO. In place of its seeming passivity, many of the critics believe that we should be openly siding with Somalia against the Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban combine, and should be sending Somalia weapons of an amount and power sufficient to deal with the weapons sent to the Ethiopian side by Moscow.

We must assume that the President, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs, and the Director of the CIA are fully aware of the strategic significance of the Horn—its geographical and geopolitical relations to the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal traffic, the Arabian peninsula, the Indian Ocean, north-south air routes, etc. On this they surely do not need lessons from amateurs. We have, moreover, no reason to doubt their devotion to the nation’s security. There must be reasons that they find cogent for being cautious, and for avoiding an all-out, public commitment to Somalia. Without attempting to judge the merits of the dispute, I will list what I think some of those reasons may be: