Books in Brief: War in the Falklands

War in the Falklands, The Full Story, by the Sunday Times of London Insight Team (Harper & Row, 294 pp., $14.95). It was April 2, 1982, the Argentine invasion fleet was approaching the Falklands, and the British commander on the islands could spare only two men, Marines Wilcox and Milne, to oppose the expected landing in York Bay. They were ordered to “bloody the nose” of the enemy and then (if still ambulatory) to retreat. As it happened, the Argentine advance units came by air, not by sea. By the next morning, Argentina held the main island; all that remained was for Governor Rex Hunt to surrender—which he did, but not until he had ordered his Argentine opposite number, Admiral Busser, “and all your people” to quit the islands at once. Hunt had a certain flair. Nonetheless, the Union Jack was hauled down. Ten weeks later it would again fly over Stanley. War in the Falklands, written by a team of reporters from the Sunday Times of London, recounts not only what happened in the field—tales of derring-do, of heroism and blunders, of space-age weaponry and death in foxhole, bunker, and icy waters —but also the diplomatic maneuvers that preceded and accompanied the fighting. Appeasement hadn’t worked. When Argentine workmen raised their flag on South Georgia Island—an obvious provocation —Lord Carrington first wrote a stiff note to Buenos Aires, but then decided not to send it. “Ironically,” the authors conclude, “this careful restraint had the opposite effect in Buenos Aires, where it reinforced the Argentinian view that the British were not disposed to take strong action over the Falklands.” That was a bad miscalculation, as President Galtieri was to discover. Once the die was cast, Britain became its professional best. First it took the diplomatic offensive: at the United Nations, where it lobbied successfully for Resolution 502 condemning the Argentine invasion; in Washington, where Ambassador Henderson rounded up congressional support; in Brussels, where the Common Market was persuaded to boycott Argentine goods; at NATO headquarters, where allied commanders obligingly looked the other way as Britain shipped out vital NATO units because “the South Atlantic was to prove the best testing ground ever devised for the ships, planes, and missiles on which NATO forces rely.” Margaret Thatcher never wavered. Britain would negotiate nothing under the gun. Her people backed her up, and her army, navy, and air force did the job. In contrast, there was bombast and disarray in an Argentina almost totally unprepared for war, and rifts among the ruling junta. But while unprepared, Argentina’s professional soldiers and elite units fought courageously and died gallantly. It was the ill-trained, ill-equipped, and ill-fed draftees who broke and ran. The authors have particular praise for the Argentine pilots who went back into the fray day after day, taking and inflicting appalling losses in aging Skyhawks that were outmatched and outmaneuvered by the British Harriers—blackbirds against falcons, as one observer noted. War in the Falklands is a fascinating book, and much enhanced by easily understood maps and graphics.

PL

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Priscilla L. Buckley

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War in the Falklands, The Full Story, by the Sunday Times of London Insight Team (Harper & Row, 294 pp., $14.95). It was April 2, 1982, the Argentine invasion fleet was approaching the Falklands, and the British commander on the islands could spare only two men, Marines Wilcox and Milne, to oppose the expected landing in York Bay. They were ordered to “bloody the nose” of the enemy and then (if still ambulatory) to retreat. As it happened, the Argentine advance units came by air, not by sea. By the next morning, Argentina held the main island; all that remained was for Governor Rex Hunt to surrender—which he did, but not until he had ordered his Argentine opposite number, Admiral Busser, “and all your people” to quit the islands at once. Hunt had a certain flair. Nonetheless, the Union Jack was hauled down. Ten weeks later it would again fly over Stanley. War in the Falklands, written by a team of reporters from the Sunday Times of London, recounts not only what happened in the field—tales of derring-do, of heroism and blunders, of space-age weaponry and death in foxhole, bunker, and icy waters —but also the diplomatic maneuvers that preceded and accompanied the fighting. Appeasement hadn’t worked. When Argentine workmen raised their flag on South Georgia Island—an obvious provocation —Lord Carrington first wrote a stiff note to Buenos Aires, but then decided not to send it. “Ironically,” the authors conclude, “this careful restraint had the opposite effect in Buenos Aires, where it reinforced the Argentinian view that the British were not disposed to take strong action over the Falklands.” That was a bad miscalculation, as President Galtieri was to discover. Once the die was cast, Britain became its professional best. First it took the diplomatic offensive: at the United Nations, where it lobbied successfully for Resolution 502 condemning the Argentine invasion; in Washington, where Ambassador Henderson rounded up congressional support; in Brussels, where the Common Market was persuaded to boycott Argentine goods; at NATO headquarters, where allied commanders obligingly looked the other way as Britain shipped out vital NATO units because “the South Atlantic was to prove the best testing ground ever devised for the ships, planes, and missiles on which NATO forces rely.” Margaret Thatcher never wavered. Britain would negotiate nothing under the gun. Her people backed her up, and her army, navy, and air force did the job. In contrast, there was bombast and disarray in an Argentina almost totally unprepared for war, and rifts among the ruling junta. But while unprepared, Argentina’s professional soldiers and elite units fought courageously and died gallantly. It was the ill-trained, ill-equipped, and ill-fed draftees who broke and ran. The authors have particular praise for the Argentine pilots who went back into the fray day after day, taking and inflicting appalling losses in aging Skyhawks that were outmatched and outmaneuvered by the British Harriers—blackbirds against falcons, as one observer noted. War in the Falklands is a fascinating book, and much enhanced by easily understood maps and graphics.