Securing Afghanistan

NO sooner did President Bush decide that Iraq required a troop surge than dire warnings about Afghanistan popped up in the news. After visiting here in January, defense secretary Robert Gates promptly extended the tours of 3,200 U.S. combat soldiers. He also requested that Congress provide $8.6 billion over the next two years for Afghan security forces, and $2 billion for reconstruction. This followed repeated warnings from American military officers that both the U.S. and NATO-Europe were falling short in force levels and financial aid. Gates flew to Brussels and urged the European nations to make good on their pledges of money and troops. Germany and France predictably demurred, but President Bush chided them, and in so doing emphasized the redoubled U.S. effort: “When our commanders on the ground say to our respective countries we need additional help, our NATO countries must provide it. . . I’ve ordered an increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan.” Is this Afghan surge meant to reinforce success or stave off defeat? That depends on how one defines success and failure. Violence and rebellion are endemic in this restive country with a weak government, yielding data as erratic as the weather. Press accounts routinely stress indicators of a reconstituted Taliban. Suicide-bomb attacks increased from 18 in 2005 to 116 in 2006, while direct-fire attacks grew from three a day in 2005 to more than ten a day in 2006. Opium production is at record levels, while violence has forced the closure of many schools in southeastern Afghanistan. Yet here in the north, the scene is strikingly different. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division is deployed east of Kabul to cover the approaches from Pakistan, while U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) are advising 21 Afghan battalions. The ETTs praise the fighting spirit of these battalions, which respond to Taliban attacks with vigorous counterattacks. I am accompanying Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis (“Mad Dog” to his admiring grunts), the head of the Marine Central Command, and my conversations are primarily with Marine ETTs. But it is the spirit of Afghan soldiers that is apparent in my visits to the 201st Corps of the Afghan Army and the Kabul Military Training Center. The Afghan battalions are cohesive, with 90 percent present for duty, a remarkably high figure. They are not without problems, of course. Over 70 percent of the soldiers are illiterate, and the officers scarcely know how to use a computer. The army rushes into fights, doesn’t plan, lacks a non-commissioned officer corps, bungles logistics, and fails to coordinate among units. But, given the army’s pluck and determination, a long-term advisory effort can overcome these defects (and would face little opposition from the Afghan people-poll after poll shows that they like and appreciate American soldiers).

Both Iraq and Afghanistan face insurgencies, but the differences are stark. In Afghanistan, uniformed soldiers and unarmed police browse the open-air bazaars; in Iraq, soldiers on leave and police wear civilian clothes and hide their identities. In Afghanistan, the Taliban train and mass across the border in Pakistani sanctuaries; in Iraq, Sunni insurgents and Shiite death squads live among local sympathizers. It’s true that, in the Kandahar-Helmand area some 250 miles south of Kabul, the Taliban pose as “protectors” (for a fee) of poppy-growing farmers. But for the most part they can’t count on popular support to conceal their presence.

About the Author

Bing West

Bing West served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and has written a dozen books about America’s recent wars.

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NO sooner did President Bush decide that Iraq required a troop surge than dire warnings about Afghanistan popped up in the news. After visiting here in January, defense secretary Robert Gates promptly extended the tours of 3,200 U.S. combat soldiers. He also requested that Congress provide $8.6 billion over the next two years for Afghan security forces, and $2 billion for reconstruction. This followed repeated warnings from American military officers that both the U.S. and NATO-Europe were falling short in force levels and financial aid. Gates flew to Brussels and urged the European nations to make good on their pledges of money and troops. Germany and France predictably demurred, but President Bush chided them, and in so doing emphasized the redoubled U.S. effort: “When our commanders on the ground say to our respective countries we need additional help, our NATO countries must provide it. . . I’ve ordered an increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan.” Is this Afghan surge meant to reinforce success or stave off defeat? That depends on how one defines success and failure. Violence and rebellion are endemic in this restive country with a weak government, yielding data as erratic as the weather. Press accounts routinely stress indicators of a reconstituted Taliban. Suicide-bomb attacks increased from 18 in 2005 to 116 in 2006, while direct-fire attacks grew from three a day in 2005 to more than ten a day in 2006. Opium production is at record levels, while violence has forced the closure of many schools in southeastern Afghanistan. Yet here in the north, the scene is strikingly different. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division is deployed east of Kabul to cover the approaches from Pakistan, while U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) are advising 21 Afghan battalions. The ETTs praise the fighting spirit of these battalions, which respond to Taliban attacks with vigorous counterattacks. I am accompanying Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis (“Mad Dog” to his admiring grunts), the head of the Marine Central Command, and my conversations are primarily with Marine ETTs. But it is the spirit of Afghan soldiers that is apparent in my visits to the 201st Corps of the Afghan Army and the Kabul Military Training Center. The Afghan battalions are cohesive, with 90 percent present for duty, a remarkably high figure. They are not without problems, of course. Over 70 percent of the soldiers are illiterate, and the officers scarcely know how to use a computer. The army rushes into fights, doesn’t plan, lacks a non-commissioned officer corps, bungles logistics, and fails to coordinate among units. But, given the army’s pluck and determination, a long-term advisory effort can overcome these defects (and would face little opposition from the Afghan people-poll after poll shows that they like and appreciate American soldiers).

Both Iraq and Afghanistan face insurgencies, but the differences are stark. In Afghanistan, uniformed soldiers and unarmed police browse the open-air bazaars; in Iraq, soldiers on leave and police wear civilian clothes and hide their identities. In Afghanistan, the Taliban train and mass across the border in Pakistani sanctuaries; in Iraq, Sunni insurgents and Shiite death squads live among local sympathizers. It’s true that, in the Kandahar-Helmand area some 250 miles south of Kabul, the Taliban pose as “protectors” (for a fee) of poppy-growing farmers. But for the most part they can’t count on popular support to conceal their presence.