Taming the Saudis

All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this . . .

When the Carter Administration was finally put out of its misery last November, there was gloom among the Al Saud, the family that owns and rules Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had enjoyed four uninterrupted years of bullying and bamboozling the American government. The lead role (in a star-studded cast) was played by Jimmy Carter, who gushed with gratitude whenever the Saudis, for cold financial reasons, temporarily raised oil production. A supporting role was played by National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who confided to the New York Times last March that we had no reason either to “fear or deplore” an “Islamic renaissance,” and who envisioned a natural partnership with Islam to protect the Gulf. (No wonder a journalist in Riyadh described Brzezinski as “a man after Crown Prince Fahd’s own heart.”) There was Secretary of the Treasury Miller, who winged his way to Saudi Arabia in November 1979 hoping, as he put it, to convince “our friends” in the Gulf that there was no reason to raise prices further after the gigantic boost of the previous June (“It’s unrealistic not to expect some upward adjustment in prices,” said a chastened Mr. Miller on the plane home). There was Secretary of Energy Duncan, whose Saudi pilgrimage took place in late February 1980, to beg for royal assent to our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (permission denied). And on location in Riyadh there was Ambassador John C. West. Mr. West began his service by obtaining a job for a close friend, Crawford Cook, in the Saudi lobbying machine, and ended his tour with a valedictory that admonished, not the Saudis, but his own government for failing to satisfy every Saudi demand.

PL

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Peter Lubin

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All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this . . .

When the Carter Administration was finally put out of its misery last November, there was gloom among the Al Saud, the family that owns and rules Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had enjoyed four uninterrupted years of bullying and bamboozling the American government. The lead role (in a star-studded cast) was played by Jimmy Carter, who gushed with gratitude whenever the Saudis, for cold financial reasons, temporarily raised oil production. A supporting role was played by National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who confided to the New York Times last March that we had no reason either to “fear or deplore” an “Islamic renaissance,” and who envisioned a natural partnership with Islam to protect the Gulf. (No wonder a journalist in Riyadh described Brzezinski as “a man after Crown Prince Fahd’s own heart.”) There was Secretary of the Treasury Miller, who winged his way to Saudi Arabia in November 1979 hoping, as he put it, to convince “our friends” in the Gulf that there was no reason to raise prices further after the gigantic boost of the previous June (“It’s unrealistic not to expect some upward adjustment in prices,” said a chastened Mr. Miller on the plane home). There was Secretary of Energy Duncan, whose Saudi pilgrimage took place in late February 1980, to beg for royal assent to our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (permission denied). And on location in Riyadh there was Ambassador John C. West. Mr. West began his service by obtaining a job for a close friend, Crawford Cook, in the Saudi lobbying machine, and ended his tour with a valedictory that admonished, not the Saudis, but his own government for failing to satisfy every Saudi demand.