Deterrence through Defense

THE UNITED STATES, having committed itself to a policy of abstention from aggressive war, is burdened by the need to deter any attack upon itself, and presumably upon its allies. If the present basis of our strategic deterrence should fail, our policies must be drastically changed.

In the popular consciousness, and to an alarming extent in the mental processes of our political leadership, deterrence is equated with fear; it is supposed that our strategy of deterrence works because the enemy is afraid of our weapons. Naturally’ he is afraid of them; they arc frightful enough, and we are afraid of them ourselves. But military decision-makers do not operate in a context of fear. Their strategic and operational planning is done in conditions often far removed from direct combat. The commanders who effect these plans are inured to fear, and insofar as humanly possible they ignore it. The natural reaction to the effects of nuclear weapons—the reaction which the layman is likely to have—does not dominate the decision-making process which establishes the conditions under which these weapons are to be employed, to the extent that military and civilian professionals contribute to that process. In the normal organization of both superpowers, the influence of professional military expertise in these decision processes is formidable indeed, and it could hardly be otherwise.

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Charles Benson

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THE UNITED STATES, having committed itself to a policy of abstention from aggressive war, is burdened by the need to deter any attack upon itself, and presumably upon its allies. If the present basis of our strategic deterrence should fail, our policies must be drastically changed.

In the popular consciousness, and to an alarming extent in the mental processes of our political leadership, deterrence is equated with fear; it is supposed that our strategy of deterrence works because the enemy is afraid of our weapons. Naturally’ he is afraid of them; they arc frightful enough, and we are afraid of them ourselves. But military decision-makers do not operate in a context of fear. Their strategic and operational planning is done in conditions often far removed from direct combat. The commanders who effect these plans are inured to fear, and insofar as humanly possible they ignore it. The natural reaction to the effects of nuclear weapons—the reaction which the layman is likely to have—does not dominate the decision-making process which establishes the conditions under which these weapons are to be employed, to the extent that military and civilian professionals contribute to that process. In the normal organization of both superpowers, the influence of professional military expertise in these decision processes is formidable indeed, and it could hardly be otherwise.