A Yellow Peril? No

IN recent years, China has become the focus of conservative discontents in foreign policy. The Christian Right accuses it of persecuting religious minorities; “trade hawks” oppose it on behalf of the American worker; what remains of the old “China Lobby” support those Taiwanese who want independence; and defense conservatives argue that China is preparing to challenge American power in the Far East.

This “anti-China Lobby” has been given a great boost in the last few years by the criminal misbehavior of the Clinton administration. But the roots of conservative opposition to the gerontocrats in Beijing go deeper. China is viewed by the Right as a strategic threat and an ideological competitor in the international sphere, as well as a political opportunity in the domestic sphere. These various aspects of the China syndrome are, of course, dependent on one another. If mainland China were not at least a potential strategic threat, it could hardly mount a serious ideological challenge; no one lies awake worrying about the ideological impact of Burma. Nor would there be political dividends if it were not possible to warn American voters, as William Kristol and Robert Kagan do in the current issue of The National Interest, that China is hostile to the U.S.

About the Author

John O’Sullivan

John O’Sullivan is a senior fellow at National Review Institute and a contributing editor of National Review.

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IN recent years, China has become the focus of conservative discontents in foreign policy. The Christian Right accuses it of persecuting religious minorities; “trade hawks” oppose it on behalf of the American worker; what remains of the old “China Lobby” support those Taiwanese who want independence; and defense conservatives argue that China is preparing to challenge American power in the Far East.

This “anti-China Lobby” has been given a great boost in the last few years by the criminal misbehavior of the Clinton administration. But the roots of conservative opposition to the gerontocrats in Beijing go deeper. China is viewed by the Right as a strategic threat and an ideological competitor in the international sphere, as well as a political opportunity in the domestic sphere. These various aspects of the China syndrome are, of course, dependent on one another. If mainland China were not at least a potential strategic threat, it could hardly mount a serious ideological challenge; no one lies awake worrying about the ideological impact of Burma. Nor would there be political dividends if it were not possible to warn American voters, as William Kristol and Robert Kagan do in the current issue of The National Interest, that China is hostile to the U.S.