Looking Back on a Lost Opportunity

In America’s perspective, the war in Vietnam should serve future generations as a textbook case of politico-military malpractice. It is useful to begin with the stating of a key paradox: the United States which performed so poorly in Vietnam was that same United States which had, by general recognition, the most sophisticated defense-analysis establishment in the world. While conducting the war in Vietnam, the U.S. defense establishment was also seeking to “educate” the Russians in some of the finer nuances of American-style strategic and arms-control theory. How could a defense community which was (apparently) the envy of the civilized world also have presided over the American war effort in Vietnam? The answer to this question is of enduring significance to Western security, since it broaches the whole issue of America’s style in statecraft, including the conduct of war.

For good reasons, most Americans appear convinced that their country lost the war in Vietnam. This is not quite true. The facts are that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) had effectively won the war by mid- to late 1972, and then—in America’s case, at least—proceeded to discard that victory. The real disasters for South Vietnam were the so-called Paris Peace Accords signed on January 27, 1973 and the subsequent fall-off in the level of American military assistance. The Accords served their American purposes: they brought about the release of American POWs; they served as (temporary) cover for the total withdrawal of the United States from the war, “with honor,” as President Nixon had promised; and they provided an interval (perhaps not a “decent interval,” but an interval nonetheless) before the military dénouement.

CG

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Colin S. Gray

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In America’s perspective, the war in Vietnam should serve future generations as a textbook case of politico-military malpractice. It is useful to begin with the stating of a key paradox: the United States which performed so poorly in Vietnam was that same United States which had, by general recognition, the most sophisticated defense-analysis establishment in the world. While conducting the war in Vietnam, the U.S. defense establishment was also seeking to “educate” the Russians in some of the finer nuances of American-style strategic and arms-control theory. How could a defense community which was (apparently) the envy of the civilized world also have presided over the American war effort in Vietnam? The answer to this question is of enduring significance to Western security, since it broaches the whole issue of America’s style in statecraft, including the conduct of war.

For good reasons, most Americans appear convinced that their country lost the war in Vietnam. This is not quite true. The facts are that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) had effectively won the war by mid- to late 1972, and then—in America’s case, at least—proceeded to discard that victory. The real disasters for South Vietnam were the so-called Paris Peace Accords signed on January 27, 1973 and the subsequent fall-off in the level of American military assistance. The Accords served their American purposes: they brought about the release of American POWs; they served as (temporary) cover for the total withdrawal of the United States from the war, “with honor,” as President Nixon had promised; and they provided an interval (perhaps not a “decent interval,” but an interval nonetheless) before the military dénouement.