Winning, Truly, in Afghanistan

IN late March, President Bush placed a call to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy that led to the delay of the departure from Rome of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. The king had wanted to return to his war-torn country in the hope of reunifying it—but the U.S. had credible information that there would be an attempt on his life. The most dismaying aspect of this news was that the ringleaders of the plan were members of the Northern Alliance, an Afghan faction closely aligned with the U.S. and propelled into Kabul by the U.S. rout of the Taliban.

This episode illustrates a growing danger: Despite having won militarily in Afghanistan, the U.S. may still lose politically. A complete victory would mean a pro-Western government in Kabul, one that would mop up the remnants of al-Qaeda and cooperate in the larger regional war. But if the U.S. doesn’t change its policies soon, radical Islamists could end up in the driver’s seat in Afghanistan.

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Marin Strmecki

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IN late March, President Bush placed a call to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy that led to the delay of the departure from Rome of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. The king had wanted to return to his war-torn country in the hope of reunifying it—but the U.S. had credible information that there would be an attempt on his life. The most dismaying aspect of this news was that the ringleaders of the plan were members of the Northern Alliance, an Afghan faction closely aligned with the U.S. and propelled into Kabul by the U.S. rout of the Taliban.

This episode illustrates a growing danger: Despite having won militarily in Afghanistan, the U.S. may still lose politically. A complete victory would mean a pro-Western government in Kabul, one that would mop up the remnants of al-Qaeda and cooperate in the larger regional war. But if the U.S. doesn’t change its policies soon, radical Islamists could end up in the driver’s seat in Afghanistan.