Anatomy of a Confusion

One could conceivably read this book as an iconoclastic or as a revisionist look at John Locke, for it is both. But the real aim of the work is to fix with precision the nature of the doctrine of majority rule as that doctrine evolved out of the more general theory that the whole people ought to be sovereign. Kendall insists that what is at issue is not some pragmatic rule of thumb for voting procedures, but “the theory according to which political power should be vested in a numerical majority of the ‘people’.” This theory ascribes to the majority a right to rule that is moral in its quality and unlimited in its scope: whatever the majority decides has a claim to the unstinted obedience of the whole people. Moreover, it is exclusive; it brands as unjust any alternate way of making decisions or any attempts to limit the scope of the majority’s right. The revisionist and iconoclastic aspect of the book may be found in its documented claim that John Locke taught this doctrine of majority rule. The constructive contribution of the book lies in the light it casts on the theory of majority rule, by showing that Locke could consistently hold it and also hold the positions traditionally attributed to him.

Kendall is not simplistic in his analysis of Locke. He agrees with the traditional interpretation of Locke as an individualist, a strong natural rights champion, a defender of the objective content of moral law, and a proponent of responsible government. But he adds that there is a collectivist side to Locke’s thought—and this he underscores. It is, he claims, equally clear and explicit in the Treatise on Civil Government that Locke upholds the natural and moral right of the majority to define the rights of citizens, and to enforce responsibility on government. In fact, so natural and moral is this right that the “social contract” entered into by each individual in the Lockean society consists precisely in an unlimited agreement to be ruled by the decisions of the majority. Within this analysis, it would have been easy to charge Locke with a simple but profound inconsistency in thus proposing both unlimited authority and natural rights, responsible government and uncontrolled majority rule. But Locke is not inconsistent in the final analysis. And it is the essential contribution of Kendall’s analysis that he discovers in Locke the basic assumption which reconciles these two apparently antithetical positions.

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Stanley Parry

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One could conceivably read this book as an iconoclastic or as a revisionist look at John Locke, for it is both. But the real aim of the work is to fix with precision the nature of the doctrine of majority rule as that doctrine evolved out of the more general theory that the whole people ought to be sovereign. Kendall insists that what is at issue is not some pragmatic rule of thumb for voting procedures, but “the theory according to which political power should be vested in a numerical majority of the ‘people’.” This theory ascribes to the majority a right to rule that is moral in its quality and unlimited in its scope: whatever the majority decides has a claim to the unstinted obedience of the whole people. Moreover, it is exclusive; it brands as unjust any alternate way of making decisions or any attempts to limit the scope of the majority’s right. The revisionist and iconoclastic aspect of the book may be found in its documented claim that John Locke taught this doctrine of majority rule. The constructive contribution of the book lies in the light it casts on the theory of majority rule, by showing that Locke could consistently hold it and also hold the positions traditionally attributed to him.

Kendall is not simplistic in his analysis of Locke. He agrees with the traditional interpretation of Locke as an individualist, a strong natural rights champion, a defender of the objective content of moral law, and a proponent of responsible government. But he adds that there is a collectivist side to Locke’s thought—and this he underscores. It is, he claims, equally clear and explicit in the Treatise on Civil Government that Locke upholds the natural and moral right of the majority to define the rights of citizens, and to enforce responsibility on government. In fact, so natural and moral is this right that the “social contract” entered into by each individual in the Lockean society consists precisely in an unlimited agreement to be ruled by the decisions of the majority. Within this analysis, it would have been easy to charge Locke with a simple but profound inconsistency in thus proposing both unlimited authority and natural rights, responsible government and uncontrolled majority rule. But Locke is not inconsistent in the final analysis. And it is the essential contribution of Kendall’s analysis that he discovers in Locke the basic assumption which reconciles these two apparently antithetical positions.