Watch on the Mississippi

in. his thought, the assumption that the majority always wills that which is right. It is crucial on this point to note the difference between this proposition and a totally different one, namely, that right is whatever the majority wills. Locke could never have held the latter position, for it is incompatible with his clear insistence that right is a matter of objective truth, not of subjective will. But it is basic to his entire theory of the state of nature and the origin of the State that men are essentially moral and rational in their behavior. Given this premise about the nature of men, it is possible to think as he does of the right of the majority of such moral and rational men. Thus it turns out that the real defect in Locke is to be found, not in inconsistency, but in his failure to examine the validity of his assumption about the rationality of men, the assumption on which the consistency of his thought depends.

Now Kendall does not make the point, but a great deal of light can be thrown on the contemporary political scene if we think of men as acting on the latent Lockean premise, although applying it in a different way. If it is assumed that the majority always wills what is right, it can easily be concluded that whatever we know to be right is therefore the will of the majority, i.e., has popular support. On this basis there is no real need to consult the people to discover whether or not they approve of current civil rights policy, social welfare, pacifism, and all the rest. Since no moral man could conceivably oppose these policies, the explicit claim goes, then the majority of men must be for them— so the implicit assumption follows.

NP

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Noel E. Parmentel Jr.

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in. his thought, the assumption that the majority always wills that which is right. It is crucial on this point to note the difference between this proposition and a totally different one, namely, that right is whatever the majority wills. Locke could never have held the latter position, for it is incompatible with his clear insistence that right is a matter of objective truth, not of subjective will. But it is basic to his entire theory of the state of nature and the origin of the State that men are essentially moral and rational in their behavior. Given this premise about the nature of men, it is possible to think as he does of the right of the majority of such moral and rational men. Thus it turns out that the real defect in Locke is to be found, not in inconsistency, but in his failure to examine the validity of his assumption about the rationality of men, the assumption on which the consistency of his thought depends.

Now Kendall does not make the point, but a great deal of light can be thrown on the contemporary political scene if we think of men as acting on the latent Lockean premise, although applying it in a different way. If it is assumed that the majority always wills what is right, it can easily be concluded that whatever we know to be right is therefore the will of the majority, i.e., has popular support. On this basis there is no real need to consult the people to discover whether or not they approve of current civil rights policy, social welfare, pacifism, and all the rest. Since no moral man could conceivably oppose these policies, the explicit claim goes, then the majority of men must be for them— so the implicit assumption follows.