Start of the Surge

DURING this month-long visit, I have accompanied twelve Iraqi and American units in Anbar Province (including Habbaniyah, Haditha, Ramadi, Saqwaniyah, and the Zidon) and Baghdad (including Rusafa, Sadr City, Azamiyiah, Khalidiah, and Ghazaliyah). I have visited these areas many times since 2003, and it appears to me that, in both Anbar and Baghdad, the war-fighting strategies are now sound and clear. This should not be taken for granted; the U.S. strategy in Iraq has been erratic. Iraq’s 26 million traumatized inhabitants have few leaders, are rent by religious and ethnic antagonisms, and are slaughtered and terrified by the Grendel-like monster called al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The reasonable timeline for counterinsurgency and nation-building under such conditions is ten to twenty years. The administration and the Pentagon envisioned completing “full-spectrum counterinsurgency”-i.e., clearing, holding, and rebuilding the key cities-in 2005; transitioning to Iraqi forces in 2006; and pulling out in 2007. If accomplished, that would have been the fastest turnaround in history. As everyone knows, it was not accomplished. In 2006, as U.S. troops withdrew from the streets into large bases, Baghdad fell apart when bombings by Sunni extremists provoked the Shiite Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to a murder campaign to drive all Sunnis from the capital. In response, President Bush has now deployed five brigades into and around Baghdad, and a new commander, Gen. David Petraeus, has implemented a “Surge Strategy”-one based on classic counterinsurgency principles. American companies are now deployed throughout the city in concert with Iraqi police and soldiers.

The new American military team has infused the effort with energy and strategic clarity, and seized the initiative. In this war, the moral/psychological element outweighs the physical by 20 to 1. And on the two primary battlefields-Anbar and Baghdad-I see a common characteristic: U.S. momentum.

DURING this month-long visit, I have accompanied twelve Iraqi and American units in Anbar Province (including Habbaniyah, Haditha, Ramadi, Saqwaniyah, and the Zidon) and Baghdad (including Rusafa, Sadr City, Azamiyiah, Khalidiah, and Ghazaliyah). I have visited these areas many times since 2003, and it appears to me that, in both Anbar and Baghdad, the war-fighting strategies are now sound and clear. This should not be taken for granted; the U.S. strategy in Iraq has been erratic. Iraq’s 26 million traumatized inhabitants have few leaders, are rent by religious and ethnic antagonisms, and are slaughtered and terrified by the Grendel-like monster called al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The reasonable timeline for counterinsurgency and nation-building under such conditions is ten to twenty years. The administration and the Pentagon envisioned completing “full-spectrum counterinsurgency”-i.e., clearing, holding, and rebuilding the key cities-in 2005; transitioning to Iraqi forces in 2006; and pulling out in 2007. If accomplished, that would have been the fastest turnaround in history. As everyone knows, it was not accomplished. In 2006, as U.S. troops withdrew from the streets into large bases, Baghdad fell apart when bombings by Sunni extremists provoked the Shiite Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to a murder campaign to drive all Sunnis from the capital. In response, President Bush has now deployed five brigades into and around Baghdad, and a new commander, Gen. David Petraeus, has implemented a “Surge Strategy”-one based on classic counterinsurgency principles. American companies are now deployed throughout the city in concert with Iraqi police and soldiers.

The new American military team has infused the effort with energy and strategic clarity, and seized the initiative. In this war, the moral/psychological element outweighs the physical by 20 to 1. And on the two primary battlefields-Anbar and Baghdad-I see a common characteristic: U.S. momentum.