WINNING THE WAR FOR AFGHANISTAN

In the propaganda war for Afghanistan, unlike the shooting war, the Soviets have had things pretty much their own way. Hardly any distinguished visitor returns from Moscow without announcing that one or another Soviet official confided to him that Moscow is eager to find a political solution to the war in Afghanistan. Moscow has been saying the same thing since February 1980, when Armand Hammer announced that Brezhnev was eager to withdraw; but that doesn’t stop each would-be diplomat from delivering the message as a brand-new development. The plea for peace is usually accompanied by a litany of reasons for Western despair: Soviet losses in Afghanistan are moderate; the economic costs of the war are manageable; the Soviet public can’t put pressure on the Kremlin to withdraw. In short, we are told, sooner or later the Soviets must win the war, so the Afghans and their Western supporters might as well give in. But the doomsayers are overlooking one important fact: By remaining in Afghanistan indefinitely, Moscow risks inflaming rebellion among its own Muslim population. The growing unrest in the Muslim republics may turn out to be what finally prompts Moscow to end the Afghan war.

The Soviet Muslim republics have never been completely integrated into the Russian empire. Within these republics, all key positions in the Red Army, the KGB and the Border Guards (which are part of the KGB), the Department of Economic Planning, and the Ministries of Irrigation and Finance are controlled by Russians. The same holds true for the Communist Party hierarchy: At all levels (republic, region, district, city) the Second Secretary, who is the actual Party boss, is always a Russian or other Slav.

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Alexandre Bennigsen

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In the propaganda war for Afghanistan, unlike the shooting war, the Soviets have had things pretty much their own way. Hardly any distinguished visitor returns from Moscow without announcing that one or another Soviet official confided to him that Moscow is eager to find a political solution to the war in Afghanistan. Moscow has been saying the same thing since February 1980, when Armand Hammer announced that Brezhnev was eager to withdraw; but that doesn’t stop each would-be diplomat from delivering the message as a brand-new development. The plea for peace is usually accompanied by a litany of reasons for Western despair: Soviet losses in Afghanistan are moderate; the economic costs of the war are manageable; the Soviet public can’t put pressure on the Kremlin to withdraw. In short, we are told, sooner or later the Soviets must win the war, so the Afghans and their Western supporters might as well give in. But the doomsayers are overlooking one important fact: By remaining in Afghanistan indefinitely, Moscow risks inflaming rebellion among its own Muslim population. The growing unrest in the Muslim republics may turn out to be what finally prompts Moscow to end the Afghan war.

The Soviet Muslim republics have never been completely integrated into the Russian empire. Within these republics, all key positions in the Red Army, the KGB and the Border Guards (which are part of the KGB), the Department of Economic Planning, and the Ministries of Irrigation and Finance are controlled by Russians. The same holds true for the Communist Party hierarchy: At all levels (republic, region, district, city) the Second Secretary, who is the actual Party boss, is always a Russian or other Slav.