Not-So-Special Operation

WHEN it comes to America’s ongoing war to destroy al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, any outcome short of decisive victory is simply unacceptable. But as President Bush and other members of his administration have repeatedly emphasized, the present conflict is not simply an isolated challenge to he confronted and overcome so that life can return to normal. There will he no such return. Colin Powell has rightly noted that, after just slightly more than a decade, the prodigal era that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall has ended. The events of September 11 plunged the United States into a menacing new age of insecurity, in which we are destined to live out our days.

Thus, the ongoing Afghan war not only marks the Pentagon’s response to the attack of September 11; it also provides a preliminary assessment of the nation’s capacity to address the dangers awaiting it in this new era. In that regard, the war’s first weeks offer little cause for comfort. Based on the available evidence, it appears that the world’s most generously endowed and best-trained military forces lack the tools—conceptual as well as material— to deal effectively with the enemies we face. The conceptual deficit may be greater than the material one; it is not our weapons that have been found most seriously wanting in Afghanistan, but the ideas underpinning a deeply flawed “American Way of War.”

AJ

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Andrew J. Bacevich

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WHEN it comes to America’s ongoing war to destroy al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, any outcome short of decisive victory is simply unacceptable. But as President Bush and other members of his administration have repeatedly emphasized, the present conflict is not simply an isolated challenge to he confronted and overcome so that life can return to normal. There will he no such return. Colin Powell has rightly noted that, after just slightly more than a decade, the prodigal era that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall has ended. The events of September 11 plunged the United States into a menacing new age of insecurity, in which we are destined to live out our days.

Thus, the ongoing Afghan war not only marks the Pentagon’s response to the attack of September 11; it also provides a preliminary assessment of the nation’s capacity to address the dangers awaiting it in this new era. In that regard, the war’s first weeks offer little cause for comfort. Based on the available evidence, it appears that the world’s most generously endowed and best-trained military forces lack the tools—conceptual as well as material— to deal effectively with the enemies we face. The conceptual deficit may be greater than the material one; it is not our weapons that have been found most seriously wanting in Afghanistan, but the ideas underpinning a deeply flawed “American Way of War.”