The German Elections

E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Ulbricht’s, that is to say Khrushchev’s, decision to put a wall between the two Berlins had a calculated effect upon internal German politics which shows how easily a foreign power can influence the inner balance and the whole structure of a democratic republic. In such a state constant flux characterizes political life, but, on the other hand, specific dates are always being set on which the composition of the government can effectively be challenged. Thus election dates offer a unique opportunity to intervene “legally” in a democracy’s inner affairs. The blow Moscow struck was planned to reveal the impotence of the West and the futility of Germany’s NATO alliance, for which the Adenauer government is responsible. Thus the CDU-CSU was expected by the Kremlin to lose a certain amount of votes; and this is precisely what happened. The crisis following the elections, however, would have occurred even if the Christian Democratic Union had lost 0.3 per cent of the votes (the majority stemming from the elections of 1957 was that slim). Under the circumstances it is remarkable that the Union had only 700,000 votes less than four years ago.

EK

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Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn

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E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Ulbricht’s, that is to say Khrushchev’s, decision to put a wall between the two Berlins had a calculated effect upon internal German politics which shows how easily a foreign power can influence the inner balance and the whole structure of a democratic republic. In such a state constant flux characterizes political life, but, on the other hand, specific dates are always being set on which the composition of the government can effectively be challenged. Thus election dates offer a unique opportunity to intervene “legally” in a democracy’s inner affairs. The blow Moscow struck was planned to reveal the impotence of the West and the futility of Germany’s NATO alliance, for which the Adenauer government is responsible. Thus the CDU-CSU was expected by the Kremlin to lose a certain amount of votes; and this is precisely what happened. The crisis following the elections, however, would have occurred even if the Christian Democratic Union had lost 0.3 per cent of the votes (the majority stemming from the elections of 1957 was that slim). Under the circumstances it is remarkable that the Union had only 700,000 votes less than four years ago.