Peace, False and True

BEFORE his election in November 1992, Bill Clinton spoke of the Middle East peace process as if it were a cooing infant: “I think that we have to give this peace process a chance to work. We have to nourish it; we have to support it; we have to maintain its continuity.” Even after eight years of failed diplomacy, including Barak’ Arafat negotiations that led directly to more violence, the peace process still held Clinton’s affection: “The violence does not demonstrate that the quest for peace has gone too far—but that it has not gone far enough. And points not to the failure of negotiations—but to the futility of violence and force.”

Eight months, more dead bodies, and a new administration later, Washington—at least until the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks—still hadn’t entirely given up on the peace process.

About the Author

Rich Lowry

Rich Lowry is the editor in chief of National Review.

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BEFORE his election in November 1992, Bill Clinton spoke of the Middle East peace process as if it were a cooing infant: “I think that we have to give this peace process a chance to work. We have to nourish it; we have to support it; we have to maintain its continuity.” Even after eight years of failed diplomacy, including Barak’ Arafat negotiations that led directly to more violence, the peace process still held Clinton’s affection: “The violence does not demonstrate that the quest for peace has gone too far—but that it has not gone far enough. And points not to the failure of negotiations—but to the futility of violence and force.”

Eight months, more dead bodies, and a new administration later, Washington—at least until the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks—still hadn’t entirely given up on the peace process.