The Week

What prompted the postponement of the President’s intended visit to the Soviet Union? Eisenhower’s motives, like those of many simple men, were probably obscure. Perhaps he hoped to deter criticism from Democratic Presidential aspirants, who will be less likely to risk their careers on a critique of Eisenhower’s foreign policy while there is even a remote chance that he may bring home the bacon. Perhaps he calculated that it would be easier to impose economies (e.g., in our space program) upon a Democratic Congress that was not yet convinced that war-level expenditures are necessary. But we have another theory. As long as this deadly charade of mutual visits continues, it serves to distract the public gaze from the unpleasant fact that Mr. Eisenhower has no real foreign policy. Once Eisenhower has gone to Russia and returned, he must either develop a policy at last, or find another noisy substitute for one-and his exchange of visits with the world’s No. 1 Communist will be hard to top as a noise-maker. By postponing his trip, Mr. Eisenhower can keep the world press chattering about it for another few months, and save himself (for that long, at least) the misery of having to decide what to do when it’s over.

With few exceptions, the European press of all levels and political tendencies covered the Khrushchev visit primarily as a spectacle-grandiose, colorful, grotesque. What political comments were made attributed almost uniformly three specific objectives to Khrushchev: a) reinforcement of his own and his government’s position in the eyes of his own subjects; b) the psychological disarmament of the United States; and c) the stirring up of anti-German sentiment as a psychological lever of Soviet policy. Europeans are old timers, and do not get so easily carried away by the effusions that so infallibly bowl over American statesmen and journalists.

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What prompted the postponement of the President’s intended visit to the Soviet Union? Eisenhower’s motives, like those of many simple men, were probably obscure. Perhaps he hoped to deter criticism from Democratic Presidential aspirants, who will be less likely to risk their careers on a critique of Eisenhower’s foreign policy while there is even a remote chance that he may bring home the bacon. Perhaps he calculated that it would be easier to impose economies (e.g., in our space program) upon a Democratic Congress that was not yet convinced that war-level expenditures are necessary. But we have another theory. As long as this deadly charade of mutual visits continues, it serves to distract the public gaze from the unpleasant fact that Mr. Eisenhower has no real foreign policy. Once Eisenhower has gone to Russia and returned, he must either develop a policy at last, or find another noisy substitute for one-and his exchange of visits with the world’s No. 1 Communist will be hard to top as a noise-maker. By postponing his trip, Mr. Eisenhower can keep the world press chattering about it for another few months, and save himself (for that long, at least) the misery of having to decide what to do when it’s over.

With few exceptions, the European press of all levels and political tendencies covered the Khrushchev visit primarily as a spectacle-grandiose, colorful, grotesque. What political comments were made attributed almost uniformly three specific objectives to Khrushchev: a) reinforcement of his own and his government’s position in the eyes of his own subjects; b) the psychological disarmament of the United States; and c) the stirring up of anti-German sentiment as a psychological lever of Soviet policy. Europeans are old timers, and do not get so easily carried away by the effusions that so infallibly bowl over American statesmen and journalists.