Earlier this year—in January, to be exact—a federal judge in Alabama named W. B. Hand had the enormous temerity to refuse to impose a ban on prayer in the Mobile schools. His reasoning was that the relevant Supreme Court precedents were contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution and to a tradition of firm judicial argument down to, say, 1947.
His decision so enraged Supreme Court Justice Powell that he issued a stay pending appeal: What kind of person was this Hand not to understand that prayer within the unsanctified walls of American education is unconstitutional according to the rulings of the Court? The circuit court, on appeal, concurred with Powell: “The Supreme Court,” it stated, “has carefully [!] considered these arguments and rejected them.” Twenty years earlier the Court had been equally self-assured in its disposition of Abington v. Schempp, the then-leading case involving Bible-reading and prayer in the public schools. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, noted that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Establishment Clause had “long been established, recognized, and constitutionally affirmed,” and expressed indignation that “others continue to question their history, logic, and efficacy. . . . Such contentions,” the justice concluded, “in view of the consistent interpretations of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as an academic exercise.”




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