NATO and the Nuclear Deterrent

»BOOKS -ARTS:-MANNERS<« NATO And The Nuclear Deterrent STEFAN T. POSSONY Pierre M. Gallois is a retired air force general, a leading figure in the French aircraft industry, and one of the few Europeans who are well informed about nuclear matters. Although this reviewer does not agree with all of the author’s points, it was a pleasure to study his book, which is free of illusions, does not offer unworkable panaceas, and discusses Western security in a realistic and constructive manner. It is to be hoped that Gallois’ work will be translated so that Americans, for once, may be able to go beyond Pentagon stereotypes and academic abstractions. The objective facts which gave rise to NATO were changing at the time when Mr. Kennedy was assuming the Presidency. The Soviet ICBM put an end to the virtual invulnerability of the United States. Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles great- ly augmented the threat against Europe. The initial U.S. strategy for NATO was based on massive retalia- tion or an automatic first strike. The United States hoped to neutralize the Soviet missile threats through a “counter-force” strategy (i.e., a stra- tegy designed to knock out Soviet rockets before they can be fired). But this strategy was abandoned because the U.S. and the USSR seem presently unable to destroy each other’s strike forces. Since, in case of conflict, the mutual infliction of “unacceptable” damage would be inevitable, both the United States and the Soviet Union have be- come ‘‘sanctuaries.’’ According to Gallois, the United States after 1959 was no longer willing to commit its nuclear forces automatically to de- fend Europe. The modified U.S. stra-_ tegy envisages, to oppose Soviet at- tack in Europe, “graduated” or “con- trolled” responses. A Soviet nuclear attack on the United States itself would be answered by a nuclear re- taliatory or “second strike”; but the United States would not risk its. own existence unless directly attacked. Washington did go through the motions of offering nuclear phantom Paradoxes de la Paix, by Pierre M. Gallois. Paris, Presses du Temps Présent,

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About the Author

Stefan T. Possony

»BOOKS -ARTS:-MANNERS<« NATO And The Nuclear Deterrent STEFAN T. POSSONY Pierre M. Gallois is a retired air force general, a leading figure in the French aircraft industry, and one of the few Europeans who are well informed about nuclear matters. Although this reviewer does not agree with all of the author’s points, it was a pleasure to study his book, which is free of illusions, does not offer unworkable panaceas, and discusses Western security in a realistic and constructive manner. It is to be hoped that Gallois’ work will be translated so that Americans, for once, may be able to go beyond Pentagon stereotypes and academic abstractions. The objective facts which gave rise to NATO were changing at the time when Mr. Kennedy was assuming the Presidency. The Soviet ICBM put an end to the virtual invulnerability of the United States. Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles great- ly augmented the threat against Europe. The initial U.S. strategy for NATO was based on massive retalia- tion or an automatic first strike. The United States hoped to neutralize the Soviet missile threats through a “counter-force” strategy (i.e., a stra- tegy designed to knock out Soviet rockets before they can be fired). But this strategy was abandoned because the U.S. and the USSR seem presently unable to destroy each other’s strike forces. Since, in case of conflict, the mutual infliction of “unacceptable” damage would be inevitable, both the United States and the Soviet Union have be- come ‘‘sanctuaries.’’ According to Gallois, the United States after 1959 was no longer willing to commit its nuclear forces automatically to de- fend Europe. The modified U.S. stra-_ tegy envisages, to oppose Soviet at- tack in Europe, “graduated” or “con- trolled” responses. A Soviet nuclear attack on the United States itself would be answered by a nuclear re- taliatory or “second strike”; but the United States would not risk its. own existence unless directly attacked. Washington did go through the motions of offering nuclear phantom Paradoxes de la Paix, by Pierre M. Gallois. Paris, Presses du Temps Présent,

francs