Diplomatic Folly

Mr. Finer’s book deals with the Suez crisis of 1956, and its target is the U.S. Secretary of State at that time, John Foster Dulles. Indeed, with due deference to Demosthenes, it may be described as a Philippic against Dulles as a statesman and as a personality, as well as against the Dulles theory and practice of diplomacy and above all against the Dulles concept of the aims of American foreign policy. Finer is relatively untroubled by any modest diffidence about the validity of his own conclusions; his presentation suffers from over-eagerness to support, emphasize and press fully home each successive detail of his indictment. A public prosecutor pursuing such tactics must risk stirring up the sympathy of jurors for the luckless defendant; so also with Mr. Finer, despite the undeniable force of his argument.

He charges that Secretary Dulles, fully trusted by President Eisenhower and in complete control of United States foreign policy, became the architect of disaster for our two principal allies, Great Britain and France, in the crisis which arose over the seizure of the Suez Canal by Egypt’s President Nasser after Dulles had abruptly terminated American support of Nasser’s cherished Aswan Dam project. The motivation of Dulles’ policy he ascribes, at bottom, to fear of war and an obsession with the “rule of law” and the outlawry of force as an instrument of national policy. As a side issue, Dulles is represented as wanting to prevent a debate of the Suez question in the United Nations, for fear that somebody might be unkind enough to drag in the question of American control of the Panama Canal and embarrass the United States.

GE

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George Fielding Eliot

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Mr. Finer’s book deals with the Suez crisis of 1956, and its target is the U.S. Secretary of State at that time, John Foster Dulles. Indeed, with due deference to Demosthenes, it may be described as a Philippic against Dulles as a statesman and as a personality, as well as against the Dulles theory and practice of diplomacy and above all against the Dulles concept of the aims of American foreign policy. Finer is relatively untroubled by any modest diffidence about the validity of his own conclusions; his presentation suffers from over-eagerness to support, emphasize and press fully home each successive detail of his indictment. A public prosecutor pursuing such tactics must risk stirring up the sympathy of jurors for the luckless defendant; so also with Mr. Finer, despite the undeniable force of his argument.

He charges that Secretary Dulles, fully trusted by President Eisenhower and in complete control of United States foreign policy, became the architect of disaster for our two principal allies, Great Britain and France, in the crisis which arose over the seizure of the Suez Canal by Egypt’s President Nasser after Dulles had abruptly terminated American support of Nasser’s cherished Aswan Dam project. The motivation of Dulles’ policy he ascribes, at bottom, to fear of war and an obsession with the “rule of law” and the outlawry of force as an instrument of national policy. As a side issue, Dulles is represented as wanting to prevent a debate of the Suez question in the United Nations, for fear that somebody might be unkind enough to drag in the question of American control of the Panama Canal and embarrass the United States.