Soviet War Doctrine

Raymond L. Garthoff stands out as one of our most learned and judicious scholars in the field of Soviet studies. His Soviet Military Doctrine and Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age are the first comprehensive studies of the evolution of Soviet military thought published in the English language. The present volume, The Soviet Image of Future War (Public Affairs Press, $3.25), prefaced by a brilliant introduction by General James Gavin, reviews the professional discussion in the Soviet Union of modern war. It contains a careful selection of materials drawn from Soviet military publications. The American reader cannot help but derive from this slim volume a highly disturbing over-all impression: the Soviet military view conflict as an organic whole; hence Soviet military thought is identical with the conflict doctrine of Communism. It is informed by a unitary concept of history.

Western military thought is peripheral to Western political theory—a neglected appendage, so to speak, of policy. Communist doctrine, since it is conflict doctrine par excellence, is steeped in military thought. Conversely, the Soviet professional soldier is a Marxian dialectician. Soviet military thinking reflects constant awareness of political purpose. The objective of military strategy, according to a publication of the Soviet General Staff is, “the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself.”

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Robert Strausz-Hupe

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Raymond L. Garthoff stands out as one of our most learned and judicious scholars in the field of Soviet studies. His Soviet Military Doctrine and Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age are the first comprehensive studies of the evolution of Soviet military thought published in the English language. The present volume, The Soviet Image of Future War (Public Affairs Press, $3.25), prefaced by a brilliant introduction by General James Gavin, reviews the professional discussion in the Soviet Union of modern war. It contains a careful selection of materials drawn from Soviet military publications. The American reader cannot help but derive from this slim volume a highly disturbing over-all impression: the Soviet military view conflict as an organic whole; hence Soviet military thought is identical with the conflict doctrine of Communism. It is informed by a unitary concept of history.

Western military thought is peripheral to Western political theory—a neglected appendage, so to speak, of policy. Communist doctrine, since it is conflict doctrine par excellence, is steeped in military thought. Conversely, the Soviet professional soldier is a Marxian dialectician. Soviet military thinking reflects constant awareness of political purpose. The objective of military strategy, according to a publication of the Soviet General Staff is, “the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself.”