Has Anyone Seen the Reagan Doctrine?

In October 1984 the State Department attempted, just before the presidential election in this country, to bring about a Central American political settlement that would have had a damaging effect on fundamental U.S. interests. Using the understandable desire of some elements in the White House for an election-eve “peace breakthrough,” State wrote up a sixty-page treaty and—without any National Security Council debate or any decision by the President and his foreign-policy cabinet—tried to get the Central American countries to accept it.

Fortunately, three members of the foreign-policy cabinet (Caspar Weinberger, William Casey, and Jeane Kirkpatrick) found out about the plan, judged that the draft treaty was contrary to President Reagan’s repeated policy decisions, and brought the matter to his attention. (This episode is described fully in my new book, Inside the National Security Council.) When Reagan was given the facts, he immediately put a stop to the intended “election-eve surprise.” Will he do the same in 1988 if, as seems all too likely, it is tried in relation to southern Africa—or, once again, in Central America?

CM

About the Author

Constantine C. Menges

Featured Tags

In October 1984 the State Department attempted, just before the presidential election in this country, to bring about a Central American political settlement that would have had a damaging effect on fundamental U.S. interests. Using the understandable desire of some elements in the White House for an election-eve “peace breakthrough,” State wrote up a sixty-page treaty and—without any National Security Council debate or any decision by the President and his foreign-policy cabinet—tried to get the Central American countries to accept it.

Fortunately, three members of the foreign-policy cabinet (Caspar Weinberger, William Casey, and Jeane Kirkpatrick) found out about the plan, judged that the draft treaty was contrary to President Reagan’s repeated policy decisions, and brought the matter to his attention. (This episode is described fully in my new book, Inside the National Security Council.) When Reagan was given the facts, he immediately put a stop to the intended “election-eve surprise.” Will he do the same in 1988 if, as seems all too likely, it is tried in relation to southern Africa—or, once again, in Central America?