The End of an Alliance

OVER the long run, the key to winning the war against Islamist terror is helping moderates win the political struggle within Islam. The early stages of the war on terror showed much promise in this respect. In a remarkably short time, using a quiet but effective carrot-and-stick approach, Washington was able to effect an about-face in Pakistan’s policies, transforming it from an al-Qaeda sponsor to a cooperative ally. Similar changes were secured by similar methods in some other countries known previously as havens for extremists, such as Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.

Since then, however, the U.S. has failed to pursue a coherent political strategy aimed at de-legitimizing the ideology of Islamic terrorism and undermining the terrorists’ sources of support. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the reason for this failure is Washington’s unwillingness to risk a rupture with Saudi Arabia. But the Bush administration has to face up to the fact that Riyadh has been—and remains—the main ideological and financial sponsor of Islamic extremism worldwide, and is not at all interested in helping us combat it. Until the administration confronts this reality in a decisive manner, lasting progress in the war on terrorism is unlikely.

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About the Author

Alex Alexiev

Mr. Alexiev is an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C.

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OVER the long run, the key to winning the war against Islamist terror is helping moderates win the political struggle within Islam. The early stages of the war on terror showed much promise in this respect. In a remarkably short time, using a quiet but effective carrot-and-stick approach, Washington was able to effect an about-face in Pakistan’s policies, transforming it from an al-Qaeda sponsor to a cooperative ally. Similar changes were secured by similar methods in some other countries known previously as havens for extremists, such as Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.

Since then, however, the U.S. has failed to pursue a coherent political strategy aimed at de-legitimizing the ideology of Islamic terrorism and undermining the terrorists’ sources of support. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the reason for this failure is Washington’s unwillingness to risk a rupture with Saudi Arabia. But the Bush administration has to face up to the fact that Riyadh has been—and remains—the main ideological and financial sponsor of Islamic extremism worldwide, and is not at all interested in helping us combat it. Until the administration confronts this reality in a decisive manner, lasting progress in the war on terrorism is unlikely.