Religion in the Soviet Union

How many people realize that religious persecution in the Soviet Union today has increased ever since the end of the 1950s? As a matter of fact, it almost seems that Stalin, an ex-seminarian, had a relatively soft spot for the Eastern Church somewhere in the deepest recesses of his sinister heart. The masters of the Kremlin today are more rational than Stalin, more pragmatic, more purposeful and probably even more convinced of the inevitable victory of Communism than Stalin ever was. It should never be forgotten that Nikita Khrushchev and his cohorts are convinced Communists: they are not Russian nationalists who merely ‘‘use” the ideology to undermine the West; they are cynical only in their strategy and tactics, not in their basic beliefs. According to the Communist timetable the advent of Communism (replacing the present Socialism) is to take place by 1980—in other words, in the not too distant future. According to plan, all “survivals of capitalism and the bourgeois order” are to be liquidated by that time… and religion figures prominently in that category. Religion, moreover, is the only systematic ideology in the Soviet Union—besides Communism—which finds concrete and, in a way, public expression. It is molested, derided, combated and openly persecuted by the Communist government. Why then, one could ask, has the Soviet Union shown such apparent tolerance toward the clergy and the laity of the several faiths in the USSR? To which one answer is that about 70 or 80 per cent of Soviet Christians have lost their faith. This may even be a conservative estimate. The lack of a systematic Christian education, the constant propaganda, the never-ending stream of sarcasm, the ever-decreasing opportunities for worship, the real dangers connected with professing one’s religion publicly—all have contributed to a steady shrinking of religious convictions. What has survived spiritually is a hard core. There is, no doubt, also a connection between the stepping up of anti-religious propaganda, isolated acts of brutality and the fact that the Soviet authorities feel unable to reduce that remaining core by “natural means.”

Two things stand in the way of a mortal blow at religion: uneasiness about public opinion in the West and reaction on foreign Communist parties. The Kremlin, specifically, is afraid of unduly irritating the Roman Catholic Church with her far-flung connections. It is obvious that in the last eighteen months the Kremlin has made calculated efforts to convince Rome that “you can do business” wtih the Soviet Union. Thirty-four years ago the pressure on the Catholics in the USSR was infinitely stronger than on the Eastern Church; the Catholics then were considered to be more dangerous enemies, if for no other reason than that they constituted a truly international organization.

JP

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Josef Panowski

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Religious Persecution

How many people realize that religious persecution in the Soviet Union today has increased ever since the end of the 1950s? As a matter of fact, it almost seems that Stalin, an ex-seminarian, had a relatively soft spot for the Eastern Church somewhere in the deepest recesses of his sinister heart. The masters of the Kremlin today are more rational than Stalin, more pragmatic, more purposeful and probably even more convinced of the inevitable victory of Communism than Stalin ever was. It should never be forgotten that Nikita Khrushchev and his cohorts are convinced Communists: they are not Russian nationalists who merely ‘‘use” the ideology to undermine the West; they are cynical only in their strategy and tactics, not in their basic beliefs. According to the Communist timetable the advent of Communism (replacing the present Socialism) is to take place by 1980—in other words, in the not too distant future. According to plan, all “survivals of capitalism and the bourgeois order” are to be liquidated by that time… and religion figures prominently in that category. Religion, moreover, is the only systematic ideology in the Soviet Union—besides Communism—which finds concrete and, in a way, public expression. It is molested, derided, combated and openly persecuted by the Communist government. Why then, one could ask, has the Soviet Union shown such apparent tolerance toward the clergy and the laity of the several faiths in the USSR? To which one answer is that about 70 or 80 per cent of Soviet Christians have lost their faith. This may even be a conservative estimate. The lack of a systematic Christian education, the constant propaganda, the never-ending stream of sarcasm, the ever-decreasing opportunities for worship, the real dangers connected with professing one’s religion publicly—all have contributed to a steady shrinking of religious convictions. What has survived spiritually is a hard core. There is, no doubt, also a connection between the stepping up of anti-religious propaganda, isolated acts of brutality and the fact that the Soviet authorities feel unable to reduce that remaining core by “natural means.”

Two things stand in the way of a mortal blow at religion: uneasiness about public opinion in the West and reaction on foreign Communist parties. The Kremlin, specifically, is afraid of unduly irritating the Roman Catholic Church with her far-flung connections. It is obvious that in the last eighteen months the Kremlin has made calculated efforts to convince Rome that “you can do business” wtih the Soviet Union. Thirty-four years ago the pressure on the Catholics in the USSR was infinitely stronger than on the Eastern Church; the Catholics then were considered to be more dangerous enemies, if for no other reason than that they constituted a truly international organization.