The Protracted Conflict

BY chance, it was while our plane was coasting over the straits of Salamis, preparing for its turn into the final approach to Ellenikon airport, that I finished studying the figures presented by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in its newest survey, The Military Balance 1971-72. It was in that small channel, in 480 b.c., that the fate of Western civilization was decided; where it was decided, in fact, whether Western civilization was to come into historical existence. If the Persian fleet had sailed on unchallenged and undefeated, it would have been able to outflank the main body of Greek troops, then concentrated at the Isthmus of Corinth, when and where it chose. The Greek position would have been strategically untenable. Greece would have fallen to the empire of the East.

No single factor explains why the Greek fleet won a victory at Salamis sufficient to reverse the strategic outlook. But there can be no doubt about one factor that was indispensable. A few years before, the Athenians had discovered an exceptionally rich, easily worked vein of silver at Maroneia in the Laurion mining region. It was proposed by most of the public leaders that the bullion should be divided among the citizens, many of whom were of the poorer sort. But for Themistocles, who, Thucydides tells us, “could excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future,” there was a different order of priorities. He realized that the Persian threat had not ended with the invasion of Darius that was aborted at Marathon. He managed to persuade the Assembly to spend the treasure on a hundred new triremes, stronger, heavier and more maneuverable than any other warships on the water. It was these Athenian ships, manning the Greek left against the Phoenician contingent on the Persian right, that fought the decisive action. Running close past the enemy vessels, the stronger Athenian triremes shaved off the enemy oars; then turned and rammed them amidships, so that the heavily armed hoplites and bowmen, serving as marines, could board. The collapse of the enemy right spread confusion in the enemy center and then throughout the formation.

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James Burnham

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BY chance, it was while our plane was coasting over the straits of Salamis, preparing for its turn into the final approach to Ellenikon airport, that I finished studying the figures presented by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in its newest survey, The Military Balance 1971-72. It was in that small channel, in 480 b.c., that the fate of Western civilization was decided; where it was decided, in fact, whether Western civilization was to come into historical existence. If the Persian fleet had sailed on unchallenged and undefeated, it would have been able to outflank the main body of Greek troops, then concentrated at the Isthmus of Corinth, when and where it chose. The Greek position would have been strategically untenable. Greece would have fallen to the empire of the East.

No single factor explains why the Greek fleet won a victory at Salamis sufficient to reverse the strategic outlook. But there can be no doubt about one factor that was indispensable. A few years before, the Athenians had discovered an exceptionally rich, easily worked vein of silver at Maroneia in the Laurion mining region. It was proposed by most of the public leaders that the bullion should be divided among the citizens, many of whom were of the poorer sort. But for Themistocles, who, Thucydides tells us, “could excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future,” there was a different order of priorities. He realized that the Persian threat had not ended with the invasion of Darius that was aborted at Marathon. He managed to persuade the Assembly to spend the treasure on a hundred new triremes, stronger, heavier and more maneuverable than any other warships on the water. It was these Athenian ships, manning the Greek left against the Phoenician contingent on the Persian right, that fought the decisive action. Running close past the enemy vessels, the stronger Athenian triremes shaved off the enemy oars; then turned and rammed them amidships, so that the heavily armed hoplites and bowmen, serving as marines, could board. The collapse of the enemy right spread confusion in the enemy center and then throughout the formation.