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the military had three viable options: continue offensive operations along the lines of those in Anbar after Fallujah, adopt a counterinsurgency approach, or emphasize the training of Iraqi troops in order to transition to Iraqi control of military operations. Gen. John Abizaid, commander of the U.S. Central Command, and Gen. George Casey, the overall commander in Iraq, chose the third option, supported by Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs chairman Gen. Richard Myers.

But while transitioning to Iraqi control was a logical option for the long run, it did little to solve the proximate problem of the insurgency, which had now generated sectarian violence. Based on the belief by many senior commanders, especially Abizaid, that U.S. troops were an “antibody” to Iraqi culture, the Americans consolidated their forces on large “forward operating bases” and sent out motorized operating bases” and sent out motorized patrols that were particularly vulnerable to attacks by improvised explosive devices. The result was to concede territory and population alike to the insurgents.

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Duncan Currie

Duncan Currie is a writer in Washington, D.C.

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the military had three viable options: continue offensive operations along the lines of those in Anbar after Fallujah, adopt a counterinsurgency approach, or emphasize the training of Iraqi troops in order to transition to Iraqi control of military operations. Gen. John Abizaid, commander of the U.S. Central Command, and Gen. George Casey, the overall commander in Iraq, chose the third option, supported by Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs chairman Gen. Richard Myers.

But while transitioning to Iraqi control was a logical option for the long run, it did little to solve the proximate problem of the insurgency, which had now generated sectarian violence. Based on the belief by many senior commanders, especially Abizaid, that U.S. troops were an “antibody” to Iraqi culture, the Americans consolidated their forces on large “forward operating bases” and sent out motorized operating bases” and sent out motorized patrols that were particularly vulnerable to attacks by improvised explosive devices. The result was to concede territory and population alike to the insurgents.