What Went Wrong in Chile

Since the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, Chile has attracted international attention far out of proportion to its importance in world politics, the world economy, or any other relevant dimension of a nation’s place in the scheme of things. Chile became a focal point of international interest from 1970 to 1973 not because it had a Marxist government—there’s little novelty in that any more-but because it had a freely elected Marxist government, and one operating in an atmosphere of unfettered political freedom (but of economic authoritarianism, if not tyranny). The equally newsworthy government of General Augusto Pinochet reversed the polarities: Established by a military coup and controlled by a junta, that government has vigorously practiced political repression simultaneously with economic liberalism—until recently. In these dimensions at least, the contrast between the two governments could not be greater, a fact that should not be obscured by the observation that the very same segments of Chilean society that were instrumental in Allende’s demise are now turning their wrath on Pinochet.

The Pinochet government has exercised power for a full decade now, and to a considerable extent it owes its longevity to Allende. Pinochet’s authoritarianism, especially during the early years of his government, would probably not have been tolerated by a populace that could not rationalize it as an “excess” necessitated by the reality of the Marxist threat. By the same token, the financial and trade liberalizations of that government would, 1 am convinced, have been resisted by vested interests had those interests not been decimated by the economic chaos arising from Allende’s total disregard (if not contempt) for the “laws” of economics.

LS

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Larry A. Sjaastad

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Since the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, Chile has attracted international attention far out of proportion to its importance in world politics, the world economy, or any other relevant dimension of a nation’s place in the scheme of things. Chile became a focal point of international interest from 1970 to 1973 not because it had a Marxist government—there’s little novelty in that any more-but because it had a freely elected Marxist government, and one operating in an atmosphere of unfettered political freedom (but of economic authoritarianism, if not tyranny). The equally newsworthy government of General Augusto Pinochet reversed the polarities: Established by a military coup and controlled by a junta, that government has vigorously practiced political repression simultaneously with economic liberalism—until recently. In these dimensions at least, the contrast between the two governments could not be greater, a fact that should not be obscured by the observation that the very same segments of Chilean society that were instrumental in Allende’s demise are now turning their wrath on Pinochet.

The Pinochet government has exercised power for a full decade now, and to a considerable extent it owes its longevity to Allende. Pinochet’s authoritarianism, especially during the early years of his government, would probably not have been tolerated by a populace that could not rationalize it as an “excess” necessitated by the reality of the Marxist threat. By the same token, the financial and trade liberalizations of that government would, 1 am convinced, have been resisted by vested interests had those interests not been decimated by the economic chaos arising from Allende’s total disregard (if not contempt) for the “laws” of economics.