THE RIGHT BOOKS

Although for the past several years I have found myself putting the word “conservative,” when applied to the Reagan Administration, between mental quotation marks, I admit to finding grounds for partially renewed confidence in the accomplishments of that Administration in The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance (Chatham House, Box 1, Chatham, N.J. 07928; $25), edited by Charles O. Jones. In these ten articles, I believe—and particularly in Aaron Wil-davsky’s concluding piece—is likely to be found the strongest and most complete defense of the Reagan agenda and performance that will—and can —ever be made.

The theme most prevalent in this collection is that, whatever else the President may have accomplished, he has forced American politicians to define themselves by reference to where they stand in relationship to himself. Or, as James W. Ceaser put it, “it is clear that Reagan has succeeded for the moment in making his program the ‘base’ of American political discourse.” In fact, Jones attributes the Administration’s loss of momentum to its earliest successes, when, in 1981, the President took advantage of favorable conditions to produce rapid and deeply cutting changes in American policy. “The next President and Congress,” Jones concludes, “cannot easily escape the Reagan legacy. They may be able to manage it better without him, however. Presidents who achieve policy breakthroughs are not the best ones to control the subsequent effects.”

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Although for the past several years I have found myself putting the word “conservative,” when applied to the Reagan Administration, between mental quotation marks, I admit to finding grounds for partially renewed confidence in the accomplishments of that Administration in The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance (Chatham House, Box 1, Chatham, N.J. 07928; $25), edited by Charles O. Jones. In these ten articles, I believe—and particularly in Aaron Wil-davsky’s concluding piece—is likely to be found the strongest and most complete defense of the Reagan agenda and performance that will—and can —ever be made.

The theme most prevalent in this collection is that, whatever else the President may have accomplished, he has forced American politicians to define themselves by reference to where they stand in relationship to himself. Or, as James W. Ceaser put it, “it is clear that Reagan has succeeded for the moment in making his program the ‘base’ of American political discourse.” In fact, Jones attributes the Administration’s loss of momentum to its earliest successes, when, in 1981, the President took advantage of favorable conditions to produce rapid and deeply cutting changes in American policy. “The next President and Congress,” Jones concludes, “cannot easily escape the Reagan legacy. They may be able to manage it better without him, however. Presidents who achieve policy breakthroughs are not the best ones to control the subsequent effects.”