The Week

Wasn’t Al Capone a community organizer, in a manner of speaking?

How does a general responsible for a failed strategy in a major war redeem himself? By talking to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, who is notorious for rewarding his sources with sympathetic treatment. That’s why Gen. George Casey, who obviously spent long hours with Woodward, gets an oddly favorable portrayal for defending a losing strategy in Iraq to the bitter end. Woodward writes as though President Bush did something wrong in executing an end-run around Casey and the recalcitrant brass of the Joint Chiefs to find and implement a strategy that might work in Iraq. That strategy was, of course, the surge. The facts make it plain-notwithstanding Woodward’s tone-that Bush made a decision of great courage and independence when many at the Pentagon valued getting out of Iraq over winning. Woodward’s judgment is askew in other ways. He attributes the increased security in Iraq less to the surge than to a program of targeted assassinations. This was important, but would not have been as effective without the better intelligence that came from an Iraqi population that felt safe enough to give us tips after our troops moved into population centers as part of the surge. There would be no success to argue over if President Bush had not been more determined to win than many of his generals.

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Wasn’t Al Capone a community organizer, in a manner of speaking?

How does a general responsible for a failed strategy in a major war redeem himself? By talking to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, who is notorious for rewarding his sources with sympathetic treatment. That’s why Gen. George Casey, who obviously spent long hours with Woodward, gets an oddly favorable portrayal for defending a losing strategy in Iraq to the bitter end. Woodward writes as though President Bush did something wrong in executing an end-run around Casey and the recalcitrant brass of the Joint Chiefs to find and implement a strategy that might work in Iraq. That strategy was, of course, the surge. The facts make it plain-notwithstanding Woodward’s tone-that Bush made a decision of great courage and independence when many at the Pentagon valued getting out of Iraq over winning. Woodward’s judgment is askew in other ways. He attributes the increased security in Iraq less to the surge than to a program of targeted assassinations. This was important, but would not have been as effective without the better intelligence that came from an Iraqi population that felt safe enough to give us tips after our troops moved into population centers as part of the surge. There would be no success to argue over if President Bush had not been more determined to win than many of his generals.