The Lesson of the Congo

Readers of NR may remember that in December 1961 I went to the Congo and on my return reported some facts the UN was trying to hide [“The UN War in Katanga,” March 27, 1962]—for instance that its troops (contrary to written promises) had attacked Katanga to conquer it for the central government, while pretending that they were defending themselves against Tshombe’s “mercenaries.” The UN called me a liar at the time but has since conceded its war guilt. (Conor Cruise O’Brien, then in charge—and since rewarded by the dictator of Ghana, who made him Vice Chancellor of his university—came clean; and the issue became moot after, on its fourth attempt, the UN finally did conquer Katanga for the central government.) Perhaps the UN one day will be compelled to admit as well, what everybody who was there knows—that its commanders were unable to control their motley troops, who murdered, robbed and committed other crimes while the UN, to save its “face,” prevented investigation, let alone punishment.

The dead cannot be revived. The murderers are not likely to be punished. But now that the UN has finally left the Congo one may ask what it has accomplished there. Is the Congo better off through the UN intervention than it would have been without? Was American policy—which made the UN expedition possible by supporting and financing it—in the American interest? Was anyone benefited by it? Was world peace preserved or fostered by the UN war? Certainly we ought to learn something from so costly an experience. Let’s try.

EH

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Ernest van den Haag

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Readers of NR may remember that in December 1961 I went to the Congo and on my return reported some facts the UN was trying to hide [“The UN War in Katanga,” March 27, 1962]—for instance that its troops (contrary to written promises) had attacked Katanga to conquer it for the central government, while pretending that they were defending themselves against Tshombe’s “mercenaries.” The UN called me a liar at the time but has since conceded its war guilt. (Conor Cruise O’Brien, then in charge—and since rewarded by the dictator of Ghana, who made him Vice Chancellor of his university—came clean; and the issue became moot after, on its fourth attempt, the UN finally did conquer Katanga for the central government.) Perhaps the UN one day will be compelled to admit as well, what everybody who was there knows—that its commanders were unable to control their motley troops, who murdered, robbed and committed other crimes while the UN, to save its “face,” prevented investigation, let alone punishment.

The dead cannot be revived. The murderers are not likely to be punished. But now that the UN has finally left the Congo one may ask what it has accomplished there. Is the Congo better off through the UN intervention than it would have been without? Was American policy—which made the UN expedition possible by supporting and financing it—in the American interest? Was anyone benefited by it? Was world peace preserved or fostered by the UN war? Certainly we ought to learn something from so costly an experience. Let’s try.