I wonder what our military leaders studied in their history courses. Did academia fail them, or did they fail to consult academia?

Peter Pace participated in a discussion that was broadcast on C-Span recently, in which he said that post-Saddam planning was so minimal because there was the expectation that once the dictator was deposed, the Iraqi army would rally to the Allies and participate in building the new Iraq. Doesn’t this seem incredibly naive? I would be interested to hear what military historians think of that, and if they can cite enough examples from history to justify that as the American strategy — examples in which, once a leader was deposed, his army spontaneously rallied to help the conquerers. Maybe it has happened more than I’m thinking.

Pace also said that the discussions the military advisers had with the president were free and open and everyone was allowed to express himself. So did anyone challenge the notion that the Iraqi army would rush forward to aid the Americans once Saddam was deposed?