Comments by Bill at InDC Journal inspired this thought…

So… what happens if, in mid-September, we hear from Petraeus and Crocker, and the report is that the U.S. military surge has succeeded in key goals like pacifying regions like Anbar province and certain Baghdad neighborhoods, inflicting serious casualties on al-Qaeda in Iraq, and persuade 25,000 Iraqis to abandon the insurgency… while at the same time, we have seen the Iraqi political system fall apart? What if troubles in Basra, the depature of additional cabinet members, etc., are signs that Iraqi’s current political leadership is incapable of unifying the country?

What if the result of the surge is significant progress on the military front, but no corresponding progress on the political front? How do the various candidates respond to that?

The AP’s Robert Burns’ latest piece* begins with a shockingly simple declarative sentence: “The new U.S. military strategy in Iraq, unveiled six months ago to little acclaim, is working.” More:

The U.S. military, partnering in many instances with Iraqi forces, is now creating that security cushion not everywhere, but in much of the north, the west and most importantly in key areas of Baghdad.
Sectarian killings continue and extremist groups remain a threat, yet they are being squeezed harder. The U.S. military has caught some momentum, thanks to the extra 30,000 troops for a total of 159,000 on the ground that Bush agreed to send as part of the new counterinsurgency strategy announced in January. The troops are interacting more with the local people and are protecting them more effectively.

Does a surge supporter like McCain look wiser after hearing of the military accomplishments? Or does it look like he’s committing even more U.S. military resources in hope of a Iraqi political breakthrough that will never come?

UPDATE: Stuart Koehl of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS writes in with a good point:

The error being made–on your part as well as by others–is assuming that progress can only be made at the level of the national government. In fact, under the Iraqi constitution, the national government is rather weak, while traditionally real political power has been wielded on the local and regional level. And it is precisely at the local and regional level that we see real progress being made with regard both to power sharing and national reconciliation. Because of the social and constitutional structure of Iraq, political progress cannot be imposed from the top-down, but must percolate from the bottom up. To some extent, the members of the national assembly and the unity government are merely play-acting, posturing for the cameras until such time as a consensus emerges on the local level that will prompt them to act. The success of our counter-insurgency effort on the political front is not measured in the assembly chamber, but in the tribal councils. And there, we are definitely winning.

UPDATE: I should note that I’m hearing a similar vibe from others who have been to Iraq recently — relationships between the local tribal councils are going pretty well, while the national assembly is a mess. “The bottom up strategy is making progress, but the national government is and is going to be a disaster… I think this means we’re headed toward a soft partition.”

Well, if the Kurds don’t declare formal independence, and nobody sponsors al-Qaeda, I say, “hooray, good job everybody, and good luck. We’ll be in Kuwait if you need anything. We’re outta here.”

ANOTHER UPDATE: I originally had written John Burns, because up until now, there had only been one high-profile war correspondent whose reporting suggested the U.S. might be making progress named Burns.