On the menu today: In 46 years, the Iranian regime of the mullahs has never been closer to collapse than it is today.
I see a member of Congress, never the sharpest knife in the drawer, argued that this does not count as “a war,” merely “strategic strikes.” This is an absurd thing to say when U.S. Central Command has “struck more than 1,000 different targets in Iran in the last two days of operations, including its ships, submarines, missile sites, communications links and the command and control centers for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.” The president himself has noted this operation is likely to continue for weeks, not days. As I am writing this, General Dan Caine, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, just said at a briefing that this is not an overnight operation and that the U.S. military expects to take additional casualties. This is war. Don’t waste time or insult people’s intelligence by insisting it is something else.
The situation on the ground is changing rapidly; the best way to organize everything this morning is to tell you what’s going right, what’s going wrong, and then provide a quick summary of Iranian society’s extraordinarily complicated political and ethnic divisions.
What’s Going Right in the U.S.–Israeli Operation Against Iran
U.S. and Israel airstrikes killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. U.S. and Israel airstrikes reportedly killed former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
As of this writing, U.S. and Israel airstrikes have reportedly killed the Iranian defense minister, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the head of the Military Office of the Supreme Leader, the chief of the general staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, the commander of the police intelligence organization, and at least 40 more high-level Iranian defense officials.
If you’re an Iranian official that Americans have heard of, there’s a good chance you’re already dead.
It turns out the so-called “Jewish space lasers” are real, in a way. Or at minimum, the Israelis may have successfully demonstrated an ability to shoot down incoming ordnance with a type of laser:
Footage circulating on social media early Monday appeared to show the first operational use of the new Iron Beam laser air defense system, as Hezbollah joined the war with Iran and launched rockets and drones from Lebanon.
The clip shows the laser system intercepting a drone along the northern border overnight. If confirmed, it would mark the first known combat use of the system, which was delivered to the Israeli Air Force’s air defense array in late December.
Developed by Rafael, the Israeli state-owned defense technology that was founded as Israel’s National R&D Defense Laboratory, the Iron Beam sounds like something straight out of science fiction: “Iron Beam is a 100kW class High Energy Laser Weapon System that is expected to become the first operational system in its class. It quickly and effectively engages and neutralizes a wide array of threats from a range of hundreds of meters to several kilometers. Engaging at the speed of light, Iron Beam has an unlimited magazine, with almost zero cost per interception, and causes minimal collateral damage.”
The U.S. and our Israeli allies have an exceptional technological advantage against our enemies, allowing much more precise strikes and minimizing, although not eliminating, civilian casualties.
What’s Going Wrong in the U.S–Israeli Operation Against Iran
As of this writing, a fourth U.S. service member has been killed in action, according to U.S. Central Command.
The war is getting wider. In addition to U.S. bases and Israel, Iran has attacked the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, and Qatar. Hezbollah has joined the side of the Iranians.
On my way to India, I flew through Dubai International Airport, one of the busiest airports in the world. All flight operations at Dubai International are suspended until further notice. In fact, it is just about impossible for a civilian to fly anywhere in the Middle East right now:
That led to the closure of key hub airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha, and the cancellation of more than 1,800 flights by major Middle Eastern airlines. The three major airlines that operate at those airports — Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad — typically have about 90,000 passengers per day crossing through those hubs and even more travelers headed to destinations in the Middle East, according to aviation analytics firm Cirium.
Then later on Saturday officials at Dubai International Airport — the largest in the United Arab Emirates and one of the busiest in the world — said four people were injured as the Emirates condemned what it called a “blatant attack involving Iranian ballistic missiles.” Strikes were also reported at other commercial airports in the region, including Kuwait International.
The briefing at the Pentagon this morning from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and General Dan Caine was much needed and much appreciated.
If you are the commander in chief, and you make the decision to launch widespread military operations that are destined to include American casualties, you have a duty and obligation to address the American people beyond an eight-minute address from the private luxury club you own, posted to the social media platform you own. And take off your “USA” cap.
Sunday, Trump did non-on-camera interviews with Jonathan Karl of ABC News, Peter Nicholas of ABC News, Jacqui Heinrich of Fox News, Zolan Kanno-Youngs of the New York Times, Michael Scherer of The Atlantic, Nikki Schwab of the Daily Mail, and Joe Kernen of CNBC. Late Sunday, the president issued a six-minute video, confirming the statement from U.S. Central Command that three U.S. military service members have been killed in action:
Even as we continue the righteous mission for which they gave their lives, we pray for the full recovery of the wounded and send our immense love and eternal gratitude to the families of the fallen. And sadly, there will likely be more before it ends. That’s the way it is. Likely be more. But we’ll do everything possible where that won’t be the case. But America will avenge their deaths and deliver the most punishing blow to the terrorists who have waged war against basically civilization.
Those appearances are better than nothing, but they are less than the moment requires. Not a single Trump administration official appeared on a Sunday show.
As of this writing, the lead item on the home page of the Pentagon is about how “the War Department will conditionally continue to provide support to Scouting America following the youth organization’s commitment to pull all diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives from its program.”
As of this writing, the last press release from the Pentagon is from February 27.
There are a lot of things in a war that a U.S. president cannot control. But he can control how he and his administration communicate to the American public — and the world.
The Myriad Factions of Iranian Society
Back on January 15, William Usher wrote the best and most detailed description of the various factions in Iranian society I have encountered. Usher served 32 years in the Central Intelligence Agency; his experience studying the Iranians is clear:
Despite its image in the West as monolithically Persian and Shia, Iran is actually an ethnically diverse country. Persians constitute roughly 60 percent of the population; the remainder includes Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Turkmen, and other groups, many of whom have historical grievances against Persian-dominated central authority and, in some cases, active insurgencies.
Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah, is far and away the Iranian opposition leader best known to Americans. However, being well-known in the West doesn’t necessarily make you well-trusted among Iranians; and Pahlavi hasn’t been in Iran since he was 18 years old. Usher does not foresee Pahlavi playing a serious role in a post-mullah Iranian government other than possibly a transitional figure: “His most likely role would be as a legitimizing figurehead for a transitional government rather than an executive leader — a constitutional monarch in waiting, perhaps, pending a referendum that might never produce the outcome he desires.”
There are Iranian opposition forces with more resources within the country. But they come with their own complications, moral compromises, and mistrust within Iran:
The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its political front organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), present a starkly different profile. Led by Maryam Rajavi, who styles herself “President-elect” of a future provisional government, the MEK possesses organizational depth, ideological coherence, and decades of operational experience that Pahlavi lacks.
The MEK’s advantages include a cadre structure, internal discipline, and what it describes as “Resistance Units” operating clandestinely inside Iran. The organization claims credit for intelligence operations that exposed Iran’s nuclear program in 2002 and asserts it has conducted thousands of operations against the regime. . . .
Yet the MEK carries baggage that may prove disqualifying. Its history includes armed operations against the Islamic Republic from bases in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War — a collaboration that much of Iranian society views as treason. The organization was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department until 2012 and has been credibly accused of cult-like internal practices, including enforced celibacy, ideological indoctrination, and suppression of dissent. While it maintains sophisticated lobbying operations in Western capitals, evidence of genuine grassroots support inside Iran is thin. Notably, no significant protest slogans reference the MEK or Rajavi — a silence that speaks volumes.
According to U.S. intelligence, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “has between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel. The IRGC-Quds Force has between 5,000 and 15,000 personnel, handpicked from the broader IRGC for their allegiance to the regime.”
One major complication to this operation is that the IRGC is effectively a state within a state, and any IRGC member with any sense will recognize that this is now a fight to the death; either the U.S., Israel, and its domestic opponents capitulate or every major mover and shaker in the IRGC gets killed (or, I suppose, jailed for the rest of their lives). They have no place to retreat; there’s little chance of any more flights to Moscow with bricks of gold stolen from the treasury.
Usher writes:
The IRGC is not merely a military force; it is a political-economic-ideological institution that has metastasized into every sector of Iranian life. It controls an estimated 20 to 40 percent of the Iranian economy through a network of holding companies, construction firms, and import-export operations. Its intelligence apparatus penetrates the bureaucracy, the clergy, and civil society. Its Basij militia provides the regime’s frontline coercive capacity against domestic unrest.
The problem isn’t just the IRGC; it’s everyone in Iran whose livelihood and way of life depends upon the IRGC retaining power. Uprooting these guys is going to make de-Baathification look simple and easy.
Usher walks through some scenarios, including a “managed transition” and “authoritarian reconsolidation.” But at this moment, with the regime decapitated but still fighting, the scenario that seems most likely is “revolutionary rupture”:
In this scenario, the street would determine the successor more than any organized political force. Pahlavi’s symbolic authority might translate into a transitional leadership role, but he would face immediate challenges from the MEK, from ethnic factions, from leftist and republican forces within the protest movement, and from remnants of the old regime seeking to preserve their positions. The IRGC would likely fragment, with some units defecting, some dissolving, and some attempting to defend enclaves of regime authority.
The risk of civil conflict in this scenario is substantial. Iran lacks the homogeneity that allowed, say, Tunisia’s transition to proceed relatively peacefully. Multiple armed factions with incompatible visions would compete for control.
Toppling the Iranian regime will be worthwhile, but it will not be easy. As always, hope for the best, prepare for the worst.
ADDENDUM: Rich, with the keen historical observation: “It’s more and more clear that October 7 was for Islamic radicals what Pearl Harbor was for the Japanese — a brilliant tactical success that carried within it the seeds of catastrophic strategic failure.”