On the menu today: everything you need to know about Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system, and why transferring an Iron Dome missile battery to the Ukrainians is at least a little more complicated than Ukranian president Volodymyr Zelensky makes it sound.
Why Transferring an Iron Dome Missile-Defense System to Ukraine Isn’t So Easy
On Sunday, Zelensky addressed members of the Israeli Knesset legislature and fumed that the Jewish state wasn’t doing enough to help his country in this most dire hour:
You can mediate but cannot mediate between good and evil. I could ask why we are not receiving protection from Israel. Why are we not getting your Iron Dome, that would protect the Jews of Ukraine? Why hasn’t Israel joined the sanction regime against Russia?
As discussed on yesterday’s Three Martini Lunch, still-technically-a-Republican-congressman Adam Kinzinger is so pro-Ukraine, he contends that “Israel’s reaction to Ukraine will have bearing on future aid from the U.S. to Israel.” (It’s not really clear how that will be the case; Kinzinger isn’t running for reelection, and under a memorandum of understanding signed by Barack Obama in September 2016, U.S. foreign-defense aid to Israel is pretty much locked in until 2028, during which time total American aid will be increased to $38 billion.)
Is it reasonable for Zelensky to expect Israel to lend or sell an Iron Dome missile-defense system to Ukraine? There are reports that Israel was or is willing to sell Iron Dome systems to the United Arab Emirates, and Israel reportedly refused to sell the system to Ukraine last year: “Israeli officials made it clear to the U.S. administration in informal talks that it wouldn’t agree to the transfer of Iron Dome batteries to Kyiv, fearing it would hurt its relations with Russia, especially in light of Moscow’s influence over Syria.”
Built by Raytheon Missiles & Defense teams with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Iron Dome is considered the most advanced and effective missile-defense system in the world. It is also one of the most expensive missile-defense systems in the world: “Each battery has radar, control equipment, and 3-4 missile launchers (each with 20 missiles) and costs about $37 million to 50 million depending on how many missiles it is shipped with . . . if the computers predict a rocket coming down in an inhabited area one (or often two to be sure) $50,000 Tamir guided missiles are fired to intercept the rocket.”
As of May 2021, “Israel now has 10 batteries deployed across the country, each with three to four launchers that can fire 20 interceptor missiles.”
According to Raytheon, “Ten Iron Dome batteries protect the citizens and infrastructure of Israel, with each battery comprising three to four stationary launchers, 20 Tamir missiles and a battlefield radar. Each of the batteries can defend up to nearly 60 square miles.” You can do the math on that: ten batteries protecting 60 square miles is 600 square miles. Israel’s total landmass is more than 8,000 square miles; as of 2014, Israel planned to deploy at least 15 batteries. Israel prioritizes population centers and critical infrastructure, and the system is designed to only fire at rockets projected to hit a vulnerable area; it doesn’t go chasing after every rocket, if the likely landing area is unpopulated desert.
At least based upon publicly available information, Israel still doesn’t have as many batteries as it would like to have, and the country doesn’t have any spares lying around. If Israel did choose to ship an Iron Dome battery to Ukraine, it would have to choose an area to leave unguarded. And as we’ve noted, those systems are expensive to replace.
Then there’s the question of transferring the weapons system to the Ukrainians. The good news is that Iron Dome systems are meant to be mobile, and the components can be relatively easily transported by truck. In 2020, the U.S. began putting its two Iron Dome systems on Oshkosh trucks — and it brought those U.S. trucks to Israel on an Antonov 225 cargo plane, the largest plane in the world.
Alas, only one Antonov 225 cargo plane was ever produced — and it was destroyed in the Battle of Antonov Airport outside Kyiv on February 24.
Even if the Israelis broke down an Iron Dome system into smaller and more easily transported parts, flying it into Ukraine through contested airspace is likely to be deemed too risky. With these systems so valuable and expensive, neither Israel nor Ukraine would want to risk some Russian pilot getting lucky.
Ordinarily, shipping something by cargo ship from Haifa to Odessa would take a little more than six days. But the Russian navy is now controlling the northern end of the Black Sea, and apparently both the ports and the coastline are mined. (In fact, shipping anything to those ports may be dangerous for a long while. Reuters reported this week that “Several hundred mines have drifted into the Black Sea after breaking off from cables near Ukrainian ports, Russia’s main intelligence agency and shipping market participants said.”)
The Israelis would have to ship the components by boat to a NATO country’s port on the Black Sea, or perhaps even go around the Balkans to a port on the Adriatic Sea and ship the components over land from there. (It’s about an eight-hour drive from Trieste, Italy, to Berehove, just across the Ukrainian border.)
Then there’s the question of how quickly the Ukrainians can get trained to use the new system. As of September, the U.S. was having a difficult time getting its two delivered systems up and running.
As it stands, the U.S. doesn’t have much in the way of excess air- and missile-defense batteries ready to be transferred. But the Army has been trying to figure out how to operate two Iron Dome systems Congress ordered it to purchase in 2019 as a stopgap for delayed efforts by the service to get its own new air- and missile-defense systems up and running.
The service purchased two batteries that are currently being readied for operation next year. But the Army has struggled to integrate the missile-defense system: Iron Dome wasn’t designed to operate within the Army’s new command-and-control system, a problem that limits its usefulness if deployed overseas.
There’s also the complication that, while almost universally highly regarded, the Iron Dome system can be beaten. Israeli defense officials have consistently stated that the system shoots down about 90 percent of incoming missiles — a few defense experts have questioned whether the percentage is that high. Whatever the percentage, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have responded by firing a lot more rockets, attempting to give the systems too many incoming missiles to target at once. The Russian military forces invading Ukraine have tons of missiles, and for all the tales of Russian incompetence, some reports indicate that the Russians are learning and adapting:
The Russians have learned to play to their strengths. While Ukrainian soldiers mock their Russian counterparts, they are deeply respectful of Russian artillery, an asset that the Russians are using more frequently to compensate for their infantry’s deficiencies. Several snipers I spoke with recently agreed that the Russians’ indirect fire capability was the most concerning — a result of sheer reckless mass rather than technical skill. They told some hair-raising stories to illustrate their point, and one amusing one: Ukrainian soldiers defending Kyiv commute to the battle in their own vehicles. After a recent three-day insertion, the sniper teams returned to their extraction site to find their cars all flattened by Russian artillery — a contingency apparently not covered by their insurance plans.
The Ukrainian deployment of an Iron Dome system would probably work for a while — and then the Russians would likely counter by firing more clusters of missiles and artillery in longer barrages, ensuring that at least a few got through.
There’s another factor at work here: Israel may not want the Iron Dome system’s technology getting in the hands of a hostile force. Any weapon you deploy onto a battlefield could well fall into the hands of the enemy, either intact or damaged. Every enemy of Israel would pay dearly to get a good look at how an Iron Dome battery works, to sniff out any weaknesses or flaws.
Finally, Israel’s calculation that Russia would retaliate against it for transferring the Iron Dome system is a reasonable assessment. Zelensky and Americans may rightfully fume that this represents Israel trying to stay neutral between good and evil, but Russia can make the Israelis pay a price in blood by arming Israel’s enemies and encouraging them to attack Israel.
Would it be preferable if the Ukrainian military had an Iron Dome system or two to position around one of its vulnerable cities? Absolutely. Partial protection against incoming rockets is preferable to no protection. But Israel has some legitimate objections based upon its own security needs, the logistical complications of getting the systems to Ukraine, protecting sensitive technology, and avoiding getting sucked into a conflict with Russia.
Meanwhile, Israel is helping Ukraine in other ways. It’s sent medical staff to set up a field hospital, it’s pushed for Russia to be denounced at the United Nations, and Zelensky credits Israel for its “many efforts to arrange top-level peace talks between his country and Russia and suggested they might take place in Jerusalem.” Israel has also taken some steps against Russian oligarchs, but not as many as we would like.
It is not surprising that Zelensky doesn’t think Israel is doing enough; right now, Zelensky probably doesn’t think any country is doing enough, including the United States.
Denying a transfer of Iron Dome systems may not be righteous, but it is rational. And it is shortsighted for Kinzinger to turn this decision into the litmus test of the U.S.–Israeli relationship.
ADDENDUM: Jeryl Bier has some thoughts on the role of hyperbole in our political rhetoric, and his recent essay is the greatest piece of writing in the history of Western Civilization.
Nah, I’m kidding, it’s just pretty good.