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 obert
Wright derives his morality, at least in part, from monkeys (see
The
Moral Animal); maybe he gets his strategic thought from
them as well.
In a Slate
piece this week, Wright adopts a why-must-I-explain-this-again-to-these-idiots?
tone in repeating various arguments that missile defense makes no
sense. But Wright is not nearly as clever or knowing as he thinks
he is (for that matter, given his sneering tone, a Bonobo would
probably be more pleasant to spend time with — and might well have
a better understanding of deterrence theory).
Wright's central
insight is this: A nasty nation — the Soviet Union — wanted to blow
us up during the Cold War, but didn't because of the deterrence
effect of our missiles. Well, Wright sneers, nothing fundamental
has changed in the post-Cold War world. Now, nasty nations — the
rogue states — still want to blow us up. But because the leaders
of such nations are concerned about their own survival, they will
be deterred by the possibility of U.S. retaliation in exactly the
same way as the Soviet Union was.
So, there!
Bow down before the incisive intellect of Robert Wright! Never again
entertain the idea of missile defense because it has been proven
unnecessary, just as surely as gorillas practice polygamy and chimps
scratch their asses.
As I have written
before, there are a couple of problems with this line of reasoning.
First, Wright ignores the fact that there are two complementary
reasons for a hostile state to pursue nuclear missiles: 1) to attack
the U.S.; 2) to deter America's ability to act in the world merely
by holding out the possibility of attacking the U.S. If nuclear-armed
ICBMs are as useless to rogue states as Wright portrays them — because
their only possible use can be to prompt the U.S. to annihilate
the country in question — why are rogue nations pursuing them in
the first place?
Either rogue-state
leaders are not quite the hyper-rational actors Wright thinks they
are, or there is some good reason for them to build these missiles.
Actually, both are probably true. Deterrence seems to have worked
against the Soviets in the Cold War, partly because we clearly understood
what motivated them. As Thucydides said, wars are fought over "interest,
fear, and honor." How can we be certain, for instance, about
what constitutes honor for Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il?
This raises
the possibility for a state hostile to the U.S. to make — in a way
that we might not anticipate — a catastrophic miscalculation, as
Japan did in its attack on Pearl Harbor. In such an event, Robert
Wright the rationalist wants there to be only one possible response:
a retaliatory strike by the U.S. that would kill millions of innocent
civilians in the offending country. (It's worth noting that it is
not necessarily a certainty that the U.S. would be willing to make
such a strike, and as long as there is the barest hint of uncertainty
about this, an attack on the U.S. might not be an act of suicidal
madness.)
But the possibility
of an outright attack on the U.S. might well be beside the point.
Wright is willing to believe that U.S. missiles have a crucial influence
on the actions of other countries. Why doesn't he think the ability
of another country to launch a nuclear strike against the U.S. will
also have an influence on our behavior? It clearly would, which
is why there is such a rush among outlaw states to acquire missiles
capable of reaching the United States.
Wright also
repeats the Michael Kinsley argument that a rogue state is much
more likely to launch a terrorist attack against the United States
than a missile, and that this option constitutes an "open door"
neglected by proponents of missile defense. This is truly ridiculous.
Does Wright think the U.S. has no counter-terrorist operations or
programs? The fact is, the United States spends billions every year
trying to prevent just such an attack from happening.
The terrorist
option is not an "open door." Neither should be the missile
option.
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