The Contradiction
The U.S. wants to fight a war against the Taliban without actually appearing to do so.

October 31, 2001 2:00 p.m.

 

t has to rank among the most amazing, foolish, and revealing things said about the U.S. war in Afghanistan so far.

A senior military planner told the Washington Post yesterday that the U.S. won't establish a base in Afghanistan because: "We don't want to be caught at this point with the appearance of Americans holding ground."

This gets to the nub of the problem: The U.S. wants to fight a war against the Taliban without actually appearing to do so. Hence, the collection of half measures and incremental steps that has characterized the effort. And while we try not to appear to be ferociously fighting a war, the Taliban has no such compunction, as the Abdul Haq episode last week demonstrated.

As we put it in NR this issue, "It is unclear whether the assassination of Abdul Haq by the Taliban amounts to the catastrophic setback in the south that some have portrayed it as being. But its symbolism was disturbing: The Taliban killed an opponent, perhaps with their bare hands, while we sent an unmanned drone aircraft — too late — to assist him."

The sensitivity to appearances is meant to appease our allies, but it really has the opposite effect of stoking their opposition to the war. The best argument that Gen. Musharraf can muster in making the case for a cessation of bombing is that it hasn't worked. Which is exactly what he told Tommy Franks the other day.

The Pakistanis are playing a double game that is common in politics: resisting a given course of action, then when your resistance helps foil the action, declare it a rank failure.

Here's a rough domestic analogy. Democrats ridiculed the first President Bush's no-new-taxes pledge, and eventually badgered him into abandoning it. Then, they attacked him for breaking his promise.

Pakistan and most of the Arab world wants to sucker us into letting the Taliban off the hook, then announce: "Well, sorry guys, you couldn't defeat the Taliban — war over."

This is why the Ramadan bombing phase is absolutely essential to the enemies of the United States: It's the wedge for what will be a much broader political case against the war itself, as ill-conceived and unsuccessful.

In this respect, the strategic advice that the U.S. has been getting from British Defense Minister Geoff Hoon about how to handle Ramadan is shamefully stupid. Apparently Hoon's idea is that by occasionally stopping our bombing of the Taliban, we will keep them guessing about when we might bomb them next, thus knocking them off balance.

The Taliban will then, the theory must go, be confused into submission.

But the only way to get the Taliban to submit is to kill them. And it is difficult to try to kill an enemy and simultaneously appear not to try to kill it. The administration should stop trying to resolve this contradiction, because even as a matter of P.R. its current straddle is a mistake.

One reason bin Laden and co. have such contempt for American arms is that they think we worry about things like the appearance of holding ground. And the reason the Pakistanis are balking at the war is that there is little appearance of progress on the ground in Afghanistan.

We should simply fight to win, and let the appearances fend for themselves.

Another Awareness Week

President Bush's micro-initiatives during the war have been decidedly mushy. But they took a slight turn for the better yesterday when he announced an effort to get schools to invite a veteran to speak during the week of Veterans Day. Good idea, and a long overdue one. But the Bushies still haven't managed to shake the stilted language of sensitivity training and public health. Bush yesterday said he was going to declare the week of Nov. 11 "National Veterans Awareness Week," as if veterans were a communicable disease or oppressed minority. Dreadful. Where are Bush's expert wordsmiths when you need them?

 
 

BACK TO NRO


 
 
shim
shim